Improbable knowing and ambiguity

a case against rational epistemic akrasia

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/2965-1557.037.e202532322

Palabras clave:

Epistemic akrasia, Rational epistemic akrasia, Improbable knowing, Improbable rationality

Resumen

This paper challenges interpretations of Timothy Williamson’s (2014) cases of improbable knowing as offering support to the idea of rational epistemic akrasia, i.e., the view that it is sometimes rational for an agent to undertake an inconsistent combination of doxastic attitudes, of the form “p, but I shouldn’t believe that p”. Williamson’s scenarios of improbable knowing have been considered by many to be run-of-the-mill examples of situations whereby epistemic akrasia would be not only possible but also rational. I argue that those cases support the idea of rational epistemic akrasia only if the agent's reasoning, in the scenario, is interpreted in a way that presupposes ambiguity. Once the ambiguity is removed, they can no longer be read as such.

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Biografía del autor/a

Veronica de Souza Campos, Faculdade Jesuíta de Filosofia e Teologia

Pesquisadora de pós-doutorado CAPES-PDPG na Faculdade Jesuíta de Filosofia e Teologia (FAJE). Possui Bacharelado (2014), Mestrado (2018) e Doutorado em Filosofia (2022) pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, sob orientação do professor André Abath, com estágio sanduíche via programa Capes PrInt na University of Warwick/Reino Unido, sob supervisão do professor Quassim Cassam. 

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Publicado

2025-11-19

Cómo citar

de Souza Campos, V. (2025). Improbable knowing and ambiguity: a case against rational epistemic akrasia. Revista De Filosofía Aurora, 37. https://doi.org/10.1590/2965-1557.037.e202532322

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