Who believes in robust normative powers?

Abstract

Do we have the power to create or modify obligations and prohibitions, and to release agents from them by generating permissions? At first glance, this power may appear puzzling, almost magical, since it implies that moral agents can reshape the normative domain merely through communicative acts. This paper investigates what kind of moral principle can sustain such a robust notion of normative powers. Clarifying these principles shows that normative powers are not alien to our ordinary moral experience, but in fact closely tied to practices such as promising, consenting, or authorizing. Nevertheless, their intelligibility remains far from secure, as the very possibility of principles of this kind is philosophically contentious. Therefore, the discussion explores the main strategies available for grounding the normative force of principles capable of conferring robust normative powers. A central question is whether such principles can be grounded on non-deontic human interests and values, or whether they presuppose the existence of irreducible deontic values. The analysis supports the latter view, concluding that robust normative powers require recognition of fundamental deontic values or interests that cannot be derived from other considerations. This conclusion, in turn, leads to a broader methodological point about the limits of moral philosophy. The dispute between advocates of robust normative powers and their rivals cannot be resolved by simply vindicating one side over the other. Rather, it functions as a source of philosophical self-knowledge, bringing to light the presuppositions of each position and the deeper reasons for the persistence of disagreement.