The second analogy and the kantian answer to Hume: why “cause” has to be an a priori concept

Autores/as

  • Andrea Faggion Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM), Maringá, PR - Brasil

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7213/revistadefilosofiaaurora.6153

Resumen

The main goal of Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience was to answer Humean objectionsconcerning the aprioricity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”. This paper intendsto suggest an interpretation of the Kantian argument that, even though cannot show thatHume should be satisfied with the answer, makes clear Kant’s reasons for that anti-Humeangoal. In the first part of this paper, I intend to discuss summarily Hume’s objection againstthe possibility of a demonstration of the principle “every-event-some-cause” and his thesisconcerning its validity. In the second part, it is the turn of the Kantian answer to thesame question concerning the validity of the principle of “every-event-some-cause”.

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Publicado

2012-05-04

Cómo citar

Faggion, A. (2012). The second analogy and the kantian answer to Hume: why “cause” has to be an a priori concept. Revista De Filosofía Aurora, 24(34), 61–79. https://doi.org/10.7213/revistadefilosofiaaurora.6153