The Debate About Aspect Perception Content

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/2965-1557.036.e202430925

Abstract

In this paper, I analyse the discussion about perceptual conceptualism and non-conceptualism transferred to the phenomena of aspect perceptions presented by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Part titled “Philosophy of Psychology” of Philosophical Investigations. In doing so, I will reconstruct these positions by collecting some of the main theses of those who have taken a position in the contest. I will focus on the contributions of Sonia Sedivy and Charles Travis on behalf of conceptualism and the non-conceptualist defence of Avner Baz about aspects of these phenomena. As a result, the examination calls into question the terms of the debate between conceptualism and non-conceptualism. In this sense, the primary purpose of this research is negative since I will limit myself to sustain that neither of the presented positions is an adequate characterisation of the content of Wittgensteinian aspect perception.

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Author Biography

Maria Sol Yuan , CONICET - Universidad Nacional del Litoral

Doutora em Filosofia pela Facultad de Filosofía y Letras da Universidad de Buenos Aires

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Published

2024-02-15

How to Cite

Yuan , M. S. (2024). The Debate About Aspect Perception Content. Revista De Filosofia Aurora, 36, e202430925. https://doi.org/10.1590/2965-1557.036.e202430925

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Continuous Flow