Indexical Sinn: Fregeanism versus Millianism

João Branquinho

Resumo


This paper discusses two notational variance views with respect to indexical singular reference and content: the view that certain forms of Millianism are at bottom notational variants of a Fregean theory of reference, the Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and the view that certain forms of Fregeanism are at bottom notational variants of a direct reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance Claim. While the former claim rests on the supposition that a direct reference theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a neo-Fregean one by showing that it is bound to acknowledge certain senselike entities, the latter claim is based upon the supposition that a neo-Fregean theory could be easily turned into a particular version of a Millian one by showing that De Re senses are theoretically superfluous and hence eliminable. The question how many accounts of singular reference and content are we confronted with here — Two different (and mutually antagonistic) theories? Or just two versions of what is in essence the same theory? — is surely of importance to anyone interested in the topic. And this question should be answered by means of a careful assessment of the soundness of each of the above claims. Before trying to adjudicate between the two accounts, one would naturally want to know whether or not there are indeed two substantially disparate accounts. Grosso modo, if the Fregean Claim were sound then we would have a single general conception of singular reference to deal with, viz. Fregeanism; likewise, if the Millian Claim were sound we would be facing a single general conception of singular reference, viz. Millianism. My view is that both the Fregean Notational Variance Claim and its Millian counterpart are wrong, though naturally on different grounds. I have argued elsewhere that the Fregean Notational Variance Claim - considered in its application to the semantics of propositional-attitude reports involving proper names — is unsound. I intend tosupplement in this paper such a result by trying to show that the Millian Claim - taken in its application to the semantics of indexical expressions — should also be rated as incorrect. I focus on a certain set of arguments for the Millian Claim, arguments which I take as adequately representing the general outlook of the Millian theorist with respect to neo-Fregeanism about indexicals and which involve issues about the cognitive significance of sentences containing indexical terms.

Texto completo:

PDF

Referências


ALMOG, J.; PERRY, J.; WETTSTEIN, H. (Ed.). Themes from Kaplan. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

ANDERSON, C. A.; OWENS, J. (Ed.). Propositional attitudes: the role of content in logic, language and mind. Stanford: CSLI, 1990.

AUSTIN, D.F. What’s the meaning of “this”?: a puzzle about demonstrative belief. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1990.

BAKER, L. R. Underpriviliged Access. Nous, v. 16, p. 227-242, 1982.

BARWISE, J.; PERRY, J. Situations and attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983.

BOER, S. E. Neo-Fregean thoughts. Philosophical Perspectives, v. 3, p. 187-224, 1989.

BRANQUINHO, J. Are Salmon’s Guises Disguised Fregean Senses? Analysis, v. 50, n. 1, p. 19-24, 1990.

BRANQUINHO, J. On the persistence and re-expression of indexical belief. Manuscrito, v. 31, n. 2, p. 573-600, 2008.

BURGE, T. Kaplan, Quine, and suspended belief. Philosophical Studies, v. 31, p. 197-203, 1977a.

BURGE, T. Belief De Re. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 74, n. 6, p. 338-362, 1977b.

BURGE, T. Belief and synonymy. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 75, n. 3, p. 119-38, 1978.

CAMPBELL, J. Is Sense Transparent? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 88, 273-292, 1987.

DEVITT, M. Designation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.

DEVITT, M. Against direct reference. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, v. 14, n. 1, p. 207-204, 1989.

DEVITT, M.; STERELNY. K. Language and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987.

DONNELLAN, K. Belief and the identity of reference. Midwest Studies In

Philosophy, v. 14, n. 1, p. 201-2014, 1990.

EVANS, G. The causal theory of names. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, n. 47, p. 187-208, 1973.

EVANS, G. Understanding demonstratives. In: PARRET, H.; BOUVERESSE, J. (Ed.). Meaning and understanding. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1981. p. 291-321.

EVANS, G. The varieties of reference. Edited by John McDowell. Oxford:

Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

EVANS, G. Collected papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.

FORBES, G.; SALMON, N. Frege’s Puzzle [review]. The Philosophical Review, v. 96, n. 3, p. 455-458, 1987a.

FORBES, G. Indexicals and intensionality: A Fregean perspective. The

Philosophical Review, v. 96, n. 1, p. 3-31, 1987b.

FORBES, G. Languages of possibility: An essay in philosophical logic. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989a.

FORBES, G. Indexicals. In: GABBAY, D. M.; GUENTHNER, F. (Ed.). Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht. David Reidel, 1989b. v. 4. p. 463-490.

FREGE, G. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Edited by P. Geach and Max Black. New York, Philosophical Library, 1952.

FREGE, G. The thought: a logical inquiry. Translated by Anthony and Marcelle Quinton. In: STRAWSON, P. F. (Ed.). Philosophical Logic. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1967. p. 17-38.

FREGE, G. Posthumous writings. Edited by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach. Translated by P. Long and R. White. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.

HAWTHORNE, J.; MANLEY, D. The reference book. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

KAMP, H. Formal Properties of “Now’”. Theoria, v. 37, n. 3, p. 227-273, 1972.

KAPLAN, D. Demonstratives: An essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and epistemology of demonstratives and other indexicals. In: ALMOG, J.; PERRY, J.;

WETTSTEIN, H. (Ed.). Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988a. p. 481-563.

KAPLAN, D. Afterthoughts. In: ALMOG, J.; PERRY, J.; WETTSTEIN, H. (Ed.).

Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988b. p. 565-614.

KAPLAN, D. Words. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, n. 64, p. 93-119, 1990.

KRIPKE, S. A puzzle about belief. In: MARGALIT, A. Meaning and use: papers presented at the Second Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, April 1976.

Dordrecht; Boston: D. Reidel, 1979. p. 239-283.

KRIPKE, S. Naming and necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. First published as an article in Davidson, Donald and Harman (Ed.). Semantics of Natural Language. Dordrecht: Reidel: 1972.

McCULLOCH, G. The game of the name: introducing logic, language and mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

McDOWELL, J. On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name. Mind, v. 86, n. 342, p. 159-85, 1977.

McDOWELL, J. De Re senses. The Philosophical Quarterly, v. 34, n. 136, p. 98-109, 1984.

MARCUS, R. B. Rationality and believing the impossible. The Journal of

Philosophy, v. 80, n. 6, p. 321-338, 1983.

MARGALIT, A. Meaning and use: papers presented at the Second Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, April 1976. Dordrecht; Boston: D. Reidel, 1979.

NOONAN, H. Fregean thoughts. The Philosophical Quarterly, v. 34, n. 136, p. 321-338, 1984.

PEACOCKE, C. A. B. Demonstrative thought and psychological explanation. Synthese, v. 49, n. 2, p. 187-217, 1981.

PEACOCKE, C. A. B. Sense and content: experience, thought and their relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.

PEACOCKE, C. A. B. Thoughts: an essay on content. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

PERRY, J. Frege on demonstratives. The Philosophical Review, v. 86, n. 4, p. 474-497, 1977.

PERRY, J. The problem of the essential indexical. Nous, v. 13, 3-21, Dec. 1979.

PERRY, J. A problem about continued belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, v. 61, n. 4, p. 317-332, 1980.

PERRY, J. Cognitive significance and new theories of reference. Nous, v. 22, 1-18, 1988.

PERRY, J.; CRIMMINS, M. The prince and the phone booth: reporting puzzling

beliefs. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 86, n. 12, p. 685-711, 1989.

RICHARD, M. Propositional attitudes: an essay on thoughts and how we ascribe them. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

SAINSBURY, M. On a fregean argument for the distinctness of sense and reference. Analysis, v. 43, n. 1, p. 12-14, 1983.

SALMON, N. Frege’s puzzle. Cambridge, Mass; London: MIT Press, 1986.

SALMON, N. Reference and information content: names and descriptions.

In: GABBAY. D.; GUENTHNER, F. (Ed.). Handbook of Philosophical Logic.

Amsterdam: North Holland, 1989. v. 4. p. 463-90.

SALMON, N. A Millian heir rejects the wages of Sinn. In: ANDERSON, C. A.;

OWENS, J. (Ed.). Propositional attitudes: the role of content in logic, language

and mind. Stanford: CSLI, 1990. p. 215-48.

SALMON, N.; SOAMES, S. (Ed.). Propositions and attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

SCHIFFER, S. The basis of reference. Erkenntnis, v. 13, n. 1, p. 171-206, 1978.

SCHIFFER, S. The ‘Fido’-Fido theory of belief. Philosophical Perspectives, v. 1, p. 454-480, 1987.

SCHIFFER, S. Remnants of meaning. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1989.

SCHIFFER, S. The mode-of-presentation problem. ANDERSON, C. A.;

OWENS, J. (Ed.). Propositional attitudes: the role of content in logic, language and mind. Stanford: CSLI, 1990. p. 249-268.

SOAMES, S. Lost innocence. Linguistics and Philosophy, v. 8, n. 1, p. 59-71, 1985.

SOAMES, S. Direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content. Philosophical Topics, v. 15, n. 1, p. 47-87, 1987.

SOAMES, S. Substitutivity. In: THOMSON, J. J. (Ed.). On being and saying: essays

for Richard Cartwright. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

p. 99-132.

SOAMES, S. G. Evans, Collected Papers [review]. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 86, p. 141-56, 1989.

TASCHEK, W. W. Content, character, and cognitive significance. Philosophical Studies, v. 52, n. 2, p. 161-189, 1987.

TOMBERLIN, J. E. (Ed.). Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1989.

WAGNER, S. J. California semantics meets the great fact. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, v. 27, n. 3, p. 430-455, 1986.

WETTSTEIN, H. Cognitive significance without cognitive content. In: ALMOG, J.; PERRY, J.; WETTSTEIN, H. (Ed.). Themes from Kaplan. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. p. 410-43.

WETTSTEIN, H. Turning the tables on Frege, or how is it that “Hesperus is

Hesperus” is trivial? Philosophical Perspectives, v. 3, p. 317-339, 1989.

WETTSTEIN, H. Has semantics rested on a mistake? And other essays. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell and Mott, 1985.

WRIGHT, C. (Ed.) Frege: Tradition and influence. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.




DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7213/aurora.26.039.DS01

Apontamentos

  • Não há apontamentos.




Direitos autorais 2017 Editora Universitária Champagnat

Licença Creative Commons
Esta obra está licenciada sob uma licença Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional.