Financiamento de startups: aspectos econômicos dos investimentos de alto risco e mecanismos jurídicos de controle
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.7213/rev.dir.econ.soc.v9i1.18438Palabras clave:
startups, investimentos, law and finance, law and economics, mecanismos de controle.Resumen
Empresas nascentes inovadoras – conhecidas como startups – operam em situação de incerteza e risco. Este contexto decorre de características recorrentes destas empresas, como o oferecimento de produtos ou serviços inovadores, falta de experiência, pouco tempo de existência, porte, etc. Diante deste cenário, é possível encontrar diversos problemas enfrentados por tais empresas, capazes de afastar investidores, como assimetria informacional, custos de transação elevados e relações de agência; por outro lado, investidores enxergam alto potencial de retorno para o capital aportado em startups. Como tais problemas são minimizados pelos investidores típicos de startups, como venture capital ou investidores-anjo? O objetivo deste artigo é analisar quais são os problemas enfrentados no investimento em startups sob uma ótica de Law and Economics e Law and Finance e, assim, estudar o desenvolvimento de mecanismos jurídicos de controle, que objetivam garantir maior proteção do investidor e mitigar seus riscos.Descargas
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