The idea and limitations of solidarity with nonhuman animals

Abstract

As the concept of solidarity is receiving renewed attention in the face of global and domestic challenges in intra-human relations, it is also increasingly applied in the context of interspecies justice, where solidarity is sometimes declared a political goal. Given the arguments for the recognition of nonhuman animals as fully morally considerable beings, the longstanding view that solidarity can only obtain among humans is indeed due to be challenged.  However, it is anything but obvious that those who care about the proper moral and political consideration of nonhuman animals should want to promote transspecies solidarity. In this paper, I examine the concept of solidarity for its fit with transspecies relations of support and consider the value of solidarity for the project of interspecies justice. I address some of the reasons for wanting to be able to apply the concept of solidarity to interspecies relations and reply to objections to the possibility of transspecies solidarity. I then discuss the shortcomings of solidarity. While the concept of solidarity has undeniable emotive appeal and solidaristic support for animals is an improvement not only over the absence of any support but also over support that “looks down” on animals, there are downsides to supporting animals in the mode of solidarity. The sense of identification that is at the core of solidarity fetishizes commonalities between the object of solidarity and the agent. A tendency to focus on commonalities cannot only make moral agents act in solidarity with animals, it can also set them up for moral failure – both when perceived commonalities encourage acts of support of lesser urgency and when perceived differences discourage support that would have been morally desirable. Consequently, it seems preferable that support for animals was based on considerations of justice alone rather than being extended in the mode of solidarity.