Davidson’s antirealism?

Alexander Miller, Ali Hossein Khani

Resumo


Frederic Stoutland (1982a, 1982b) has argued that a Davidsonian theory of meaning is incompatible with a realist view of truth, on which the truth-conditions of sentences consist of mind-independent states of affairs or concatenations of extra-linguistic objects. In this paper we show that Stoutland’s argument is a failure.

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Referências


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.7213/aurora.27.040.AO01

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