Intuition and evidential facts in Carnap’s analysis of space

Juan Bautista Bengoetxea


One of the reasons for Carnap’s (1922) analysis of space was the confounding status of many arguments around the state of the art on that topic at that time. The unsatisfactory views supplied by mathematicians, physicists and philosophers led Carnap to propose a new conception of space. His proposal, which employs the notion of intuition as a fundamental tool, fared better, but clashed with his conventionalists intentions derived from an allegedly tolerant attitude. The notion of intuition here examined allows us to claim that Carnap’s target was also an objectivist epistemological program dependent on certain realistic reminiscences embodied in the notion of evidence or matter of fact (Tatbestand).


Objectivity, Intuition, Conventionalism, Evidence, Tolerance

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