Animal rights and technology: between dignity and disenhancement

Mateus de Oliveira Fornasier


This article intends to show a relationship between a narcissistic character in human being and its exploiting practices in relation to animals. Its hypothesis is that, even though disenhancement could have positive features, it also shows the perversity of economic system, which tries to deviate the focus of the exploitation, showing that is aware of animal suffering - but only in order to continue its profitable and nefarious ways. Its objectives are: i) to characterize anthropocentrism as a narcissistic trace of mankind, which allows the human being to exploit animals without self-criticism in general; ii) to present animal disenhancement as a philosophical problem, as well as several positions for and against it. Results: i) narcissistic perspective conceives scientifically a sheer economic interested technology, and genetic engineering not only alter animals individually, but also as species. This alteration is ontologically and ethically destructive, as all relationships between human and non-human become mediated by an objectifying view; ii) philosophical contrariety to animal disenhancement can be developed from several perspectives - being the most common ones in literature one based on the dignity of the animal, and another, which rejects disenhancement based on the destructiveness of the economic system which explores the animal in very unfair means (and needs a way to hypocritically veil itself through technology). Methodology: hypothetical-deductive method of research, with a qualitative approach and bibliographical technique.


animal rights; dignity; narcissism; animal disenhancement; exploitation.

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