Intuition and evidential facts in Carnap’s analysis of space




Objectivity, Intuition, Conventionalism, Evidence, Tolerance


One of the reasons for Carnap’s (1922) analysis of space was the confounding status of many arguments around the state of the art on that topic at that time. The unsatisfactory views supplied by mathematicians, physicists and philosophers led Carnap to propose a new conception of space. His proposal, which employs the notion of intuition as a fundamental tool, fared better, but clashed with his conventionalists intentions derived from an allegedly tolerant attitude. The notion of intuition here examined allows us to claim that Carnap’s target was also an objectivist epistemological program dependent on certain realistic reminiscences embodied in the notion of evidence or matter of fact (Tatbestand).


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Biografia do Autor


PhD (Logic and Philosophy of Science) at the University of the Basque Country/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, he has been researcher and visiting scholar in the Colorado School of Mines, University of Colorado at Boulder, and other European and American universities . Author of Philosophy and science: The Vienna Circle (2000), Dogmas in science? Feyerabend, Kuhn, Popper (2003, with X. Eizagirre), Cyborg meekness (2009), Ethics and Engineering (2010, with C. Mitcham), and Humanities and Social Sciences in Engineering (2013, several authors). He has published several articles in Journal Citation Reports (JCR) periodicals, as well as in some other international and national reference journals such as Technology and Culture, Foundations of Chemistry, Arbor, Educaçâo e Filosofia, Manuscrito, Episteme, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, Theorema, Principia, Filosofia Unisinos, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Theoria, or The European Legacy. He is also author of book chapters published by international reference publishers such as Macmillan, Springer or Ariel (Spain).


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Como Citar

Bengoetxea, J. B. (2019). Intuition and evidential facts in Carnap’s analysis of space. Revista De Filosofia Aurora, 31(54).