The contextual factors behind CEO duality: an empirical analysis of Brazil's case
Palavras-chave:
CEO Duality. Board of Directors. Corporate Governance. Stewardship Theory.Resumo
Our econometric analyses used logistic regression to test the relation between CEO duality, a dummy variable equal to one if there is duality and 0 otherwise with independent variables regarding firm characteristics (firm age, size and economic sector), corporate governance (ownership structure, CEO age and governance level), and firm economic and financial performance. Our sample consisted of a balanced panel of 160 Brazilian publicly traded companies listed on B3 S.A., with data from 2010 to 2016. Our results indicate that CEO duality was positively related with higher CEO age and superior financial performance. Conversely, CEO duality was negatively related with firm size, belonging to special listing segments, belonging to regulated sectors, board size and foreign capital ownership. Our results are robust to different specifications and different econometric techniques.
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