“Who am I to judge?”

Pope Francis and the strong objectivity in theology

“Quem sou eu para julgar?”

Papa Francisco e a objetividade forte em teologia

LENO FRANCISCO DANNER
FERNANDO DANNER
AGEMIR BAVARESCO

Abstract

The paper argues that Pope Francis’s attitude of epistemological-moral sensibility regarding the differences exemplifies a very pungent challenge to institutionalized and universalist religions in the 21st century, namely the necessity of moderating the essentialist and naturalized foundations which are the basis of institutional constitution, legitimation and evolution. In our post-metaphysical times, in the time of differences, the weakening of the strong objectivity concerning the grounding of the creed by theological and religious institutions is the way from which a renewal and a recovery of the political core-role of the institutional religions can lead to the strengthening of democracy exactly from the religious sphere. So, it is our belief that Pope Francis’ question “Who am I to judge?” represents a point of no return for institutionalized and universalist religions in the 21st century: to moderate the grounding and the social foment of the creed in order to protect and emphasize the normative, the epistemological-political centrality of the differences. The paper’s central intuition is that Pope Francis’ affirmation “Who am I to judge?”, that leads directly to his encyclical document “Amoris Laetitia”, establishes a dialectic between, on one side, strong institutionalism, strong objectivity and fundamentalism and, on other, the challenges and

a Fundação Universidade Federal de Rondônia (UNIR), Porto Velho, RO, Brasil. Doutor em Filosofia, e-mail: leno_danner@yahoo.com.br
b Fundação Universidade Federal de Rondônia (UNIR), Porto Velho, RO. Doutor em Filosofia, e-mail: fernando.danner@gmail.com
c Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil. Doutor em Filosofia, e-mail: abavaresco@pucrs.br
conditions posed by pluralism, by differences, which conducts to the moderation, to sensibility and to openness to otherness, meaning that the primacy of ethics regarding truth.

**Keywords:** Pope Francis. Theology. Strong Objectivity. Differences. Weakening.

**Resumo**

O artigo argumenta que a atitude de sensibilidade epistemológico-moral relativamente às diferenças, por parte do Papa Francisco, exemplifica um desafio extremamente agudo para as religiões institucionalizadas e universalistas no século XXI, a saber: a necessidade de moderação das fundamentações essencialistas e naturalizadas que são a base da constituição, da legitimação e da evolução institucionais. Em nossos tempos pós-metafísicos, nestes tempos das diferenças, o enfraquecimento da objetividade forte no que se refere à fundamentação do credo pelas instituições teológicas e religiosas é o caminho a partir do qual a renovação e a retomada do núcleo-papel político das instituições religiosas pode levar ao fortalecimento da democracia exatamente desde a esfera religiosa. Desse modo, a afirmação do Papa Francisco, “Quem sou eu para julgar?”, representa um caminho sem volta às religiões institucionalizadas e universalistas no século XXI: moderar a fundamentação e a dinamização social do credo com vistas a proteger e a enfatizar a centralidade normativa, epistemológico-política das diferenças. A intuição central do texto está em que a afirmação “Quem sou eu para julgar?”, do Papa Francisco, que leva diretamente à sua Encíclica Amoris Laetitia, estabelece uma dialética entre, de um lado, institucionalismo forte, objetividade forte e fundamentalismo e, de outro, os desafios e as condições postos pelo pluralismo, pelas diferenças, situação que conduz à moderação, à sensibilidade e à abertura para com a alteridade, o que significa a primazia da ética relativamente à verdade.


**Introduction**

This paper argues that religious institutions have a very pungent challenge in the 21st century regarding their treatment and assuming of the differences as epistemological-political subjects and principles from which the institutional grounding and changing could be performed and streamlined. Indeed, religious institutions centralize and monopolize the constitution, the legitimation and the social foment of the creed, so that it becomes an institutional matter and praxis, beyond the direct and inclusive participation of believers and non-believers, and vertically imposed on them. Now, the institutionalization of the creed—that is a Platonic legacy to Western...
philosophical-theological-scientific institutions\(^1\)—leads to four epistemological-political steps which are fundamental for the philosophical-theological-scientific institutions’ self-comprehension and action, namely the correlation between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism concerning the legitimation and the social performance of the doctrine-creed-knowledge; the epistemological-moral paradigm highly institutionalized as a condition to criticizing, framing and orienting the particularities; the imbrication between institutional science and political-educational institutions based on that universal epistemological-moral paradigm; and the grounding of a notion of human nature as the normative basis from which the institutionalization of the construction and the grounding of knowledge is enabled and streamlined.

Now, these philosophical-theological-scientific institutions’ four steps make such institutions greatly independent and overlapped to social groups and individuals and associate the institutions themselves with the very universal epistemological-moral paradigm, so that institutions become the epistemological-political subject and criteria

\(^1\) We read Platonic philosophy, especially his development on Republic, from the idea that objectivity, that is the condition of justification and validity, is reached by institutionalization, in which a community of researchers becomes the medium between common sense and knowledge, centralizing and monopolizing the construction of the binding notions of knowledge and values. So institutionalization is the way that overcomes common sense and leads to the scientific objectivity (and there is only a scientific objectivity). In the Platonic philosophy, the institutionalization of science is the fundamental step from which politics and education are based on, streamlined and imposed for the whole society. Indeed, after developing a scientific worldwide, which means the overcoming of the darkness that ensembles the cave, the philosopher returns to common sense with the aiming of heading and managing common people. In fact, in the Cave’s Myth, the cave meanings the human nature without the light of science, that is, the common sense as darkness, as non-knowledge, and the common people as prisoners of non-knowledge, using a Platonic metaphor. Philosophy, as a scientific worldwide and practice, overcomes such darkness by institutionalization of a community of researches which unveils the true reality and, after that, after constructing an objective paradigmatic basis, grounds politics as a scientific activity; politics, from a scientific standpoint, returns to common sense and educates common people from a model of public education also oriented by science – there is, therefore, a hard and strict dependence of politics and education on science. In our interpretation, this is the basic model of Western philosophy, theology and natural science, that is, the institution-institutionalization of the legitimation of the valid knowledge and action as basis of the grounding and social foment of the objectivity, so institution becomes the very basis of the social life, centralizing and monopolizing inside itself, and in terms of the specialized staff and technical codes and practices that constitute it, the construction and the imposition of the valid codes and practices to common people. Here it appears a very intrinsic linking among science, politics and education in which institutional science legitimizes politics and guides society from a scientific basis – in such situation, as we said, institution is the core of social life and of legitimation of the valid power, from an internal procedure that peripherizes common people, by the idea that the objectivity is a private and internal activity reached by institutions’ legal and technical staffs, codes, practices and symbols (we remember also the differentiation between esoteric and exoteric works as example of this institutional closure and contraposition of common sense and common people). See: Dannер, 2017, p. 11-31.
from which all practices, codes and subjects acquire sense, the epistemological-political subjects and criteria from which the differences are framed and orientated over time. It means, therefore, that the differences are subsumed into such institutionalized and universalistic epistemological-moral paradigm with an essentialist and naturalized sense, becoming a consequence of it and also acquiring a central institution that determines—by its relations with political and educational institutions—how much the differences could be accepted or denied in their singularity regarding this institutionalized universal epistemological-moral paradigm. The reason for that is very direct: the strong institutionalism regarding the constitution, the legitimation and the social foment of the creed is possible due to the association between epistemological-moral objectivity and institution based on an essentialist and naturalized foundation as the fundamental ground from which the institutional work and the epistemological-moral foundation are made possible and correlated one each other.

Therefore, our central argument concerning institutional and universalist religions is that Pope Francis’s question “Who am I to judge?” represents a point of inflexion regarding the correlation between strong institutionalism, strong objectivity and essentialist and naturalized foundations as the basis of the religious institutions’ foundation and application of the creed, social criticism and political intervention. Indeed, it could signify the fact that religious institutions can gradually overcome or at least moderate their strong objectivity and strong institutionalism in terms of comprehension both of the creed in particular and of human nature in general, which also means the weakening of the essentialist and naturalized foundations as basis of the institutionalized creed and praxis. Pope Francis’s “Who am I to judge,” which was expressed regarding the question of the normative legitimacy of homosexuality, could help us—institutional staffs, believers and non-believers—to think about the relationships between universalism and differences, between epistemological-moral objectivity, institutionalism, essentialist and naturalized foundations, and the differences as the main question-challenge to the 21st century. Is it possible to maintain the institutional legitimation of the creed and its social foment untouched and insensible by the epistemological-political centrality of the differences? Is it possible to sustain essentialist and naturalized foundations in our times without any moderation of them in their framing of the differences? And, finally, is it possible for institutions to

---

integrate and monopolize the constitution, the legitimation and the social performance of the creed as a whole beyond believers and non-believers? Here once Pope Francis’s attitude—“Who am I to judge?”—could exemplify an institutional change regarding its social role and political core: from now on, the differences become the fundamental subjects and criteria for institutional religions, leading to the weakening of the essentialist and naturalized foundations as basis of the institutional praxis. From now on, therefore, religious institutions themselves become a political praxis-subject from which democracy as inclusion and participation of the differences is strengthened, protected and fomented socially and institutionally for all and by all.

**Institutions, the foundation of the creed and the differences**

Traditionally, the Western philosophical-theological-scientific culture has been organized from a kind of strong institutionalism regarding the constitution, the legitimation and the social foment of the epistemological-moral values. The grounding and the streamlining of the epistemological-moral objectivity, therefore, was-is, in this philosophical-theological-scientific tradition, an institutional matter and praxis, beyond common sense and common people, in the sense that institutions, from their internal codes, procedures, methods and self-authorized legal staffs, centralize and monopolize the construction, the criticism and the validation of the socially binding doctrine-creed-knowledge. So, only from institutions’ internal dynamics and legal staffs, the official doctrine-creed-knowledge was-is legitimated to be objective, to be shared with common sense and common people, to be socially binding and used by common people, which means that a kind of self-referential, self-subsisting, autonomous, closed and overlapped institution regarding civil society constructs from within an objective-intersubjective creed-knowledge-praxis and imposes and streamlines it on common sense and common people, becoming the arbiter between the public-political use of it and its effective validation, by framing what common people can and cannot do with this objective-intersubjective epistemological-moral paradigm. So, the institutionalization of the grounding of the epistemological-moral objectivity is the reading-key, the epistemological-political-normative key to understand the contraposition, in Western culture, between institutions and common sense, between institutions’ legal staff (philosopher, theologian, scientist) and common man, and finally between (objectively justified) knowledge and rude opinion (see HABERMAS, 1992, p.
Here, there are an association and an intrinsic dependence between scientific institutionalization and epistemological-moral objectivity, in that institution is the normative basis from which epistemological-moral objectivity is grounded on and streamlined over time to common sense and common people. Such association and intrinsic dependence mean that the epistemological-moral objectivity regarding doctrine-creed-knowledge is the result of the institutional practices, methods and legal staff’s praxis in terms of research, discussion and agreement about valid principles and practices in each field of human life. The Platonic intuition (that is the basis for philosophical-theological-scientific institutional self-comprehension in the Western tradition) is very clear here: common sense and common people, which are very plural in terms of opinions, beliefs and practices, cannot achieve a universal or objective point of view from which the criticizing and the framing of the particular situations and subjects are made possible and based on. It is necessary to have the institutionalization of the grounding of the epistemological-moral values and practices as the condition for their objectivity and validity to common sense and common people. A research community, with common methods, experiences and discussions, with the same scientific training, certainly would lead to the construction-foundation of very objective codes, practices and values from which the society and the individuals would be oriented, guided and managed, from which the multiple opinions-beliefs-practices found in common sense would be framed and purified. Thus, objective-intersubjective epistemological-moral values are scientific, they are the product of the institutionalization of knowledge by a scientific community which becomes separated in relation to common sense and to common people in a very strong sense.

Here, the messianic institutional vocation regarding common sense and common people directly arrives: by grounding, streamlining and protecting an epistemological-moral worldview which is objectively justified, the philosophical-theological-scientific institution offers the light of salvation, that is, a universal epistemological-moral paradigm from which the criticizing, the framing and the orientation of collective and particular dynamics and lives are possible, constructed and performed by political-educational institutions, supervised by scientific and philosophical-theological institutions (see COLLINS, 2006, p. 24-25; HABERMAS, 1998, p. 07-08; MARRAMAO, 1997, p. 15-18). That means four fundamental theoretical-political steps to philosophical-theological-scientific institutions, namely (1) the correlation between strong objectivity
and strong institutionalism in terms of the legitimation of the values and practices; (2) the universal epistemological-moral paradigm as condition to contextualism-particularism; (3) the very intrinsic imbrication among science, politics and education based on that universal epistemological-moral institutional paradigm; and (4) the development of a notion of human nature as basis of institutional praxis and of societal-political dynamic, a universal, essentialist and naturalized model of human nature that is assumed, centralized and managed by a closed, self-referential and self-subsisting institution. Once more, these four steps lead to the institution’s normative centrality in terms of societal-individual constitution, streamlining and formation, in that it is the society’s epistemological-political core from which intersubjective codes, practices and dynamics become legitimized (because they are institutionalized) and socially binding, acquiring, therefore, political power to be imposed on all social groups and individuals.

Let us explain and correlate these four institutional steps. The link between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism means that the epistemological-moral objectivity is an institutional matter-praxis, in that institutions centralize and monopolize the grounding and the streamlining of the epistemological-moral codes, values and practices to all society, to all the social groups and individuals. The strong objectivity signifies, here, two important points: first, it is essentialist and naturalized, valid for everyone; second, it is performed from institutionalization, because common people and common sense cannot ground and achieve such an essentialist and naturalized foundation, which is not apparent or explicit, but exactly essential—it demands, therefore, a very hard and continuous exercise of research and formation. Now, the daily pluralism about epistemological-moral values, codes and practices cannot see this implicit basis and, in truth, it denies such an essentialist and naturalized ground from which human life is possible and evolves—an essentialist and naturalized basis which is not plural, but univocal, which is not historical and culturalist, but metaphysical, a-historical. So, pluralism is wrong about objectivity very often, needing an institution’s scientific enlightening, formation, orientation. For pluralism, human life is very differentiated, with no essential basis, principles and practices than the differences (see DANNER, 2014, p. 70-98). Here, a universal epistemological-moral paradigm is not only unnecessary, but also wrong, because it implies the totalizing framing of particularized and singular subjects, values and practices. That which is singular cannot be subsumed into the universal, so that the universal has not a proper object of action-framing,

On the other hand, the Western institutional tradition (correlation between institutionalization and objectivity; intrinsic link between institutional science, political institutions and educational institutions based on the institutional self-referentiality and self-subsistence) has insisted that without the universal epistemological-moral point of view the criticizing, the framing and the protection of all particular forms of life are not possible. If pluralism is totally right about the singularity of the differences and concerning the obsolescence of the universal epistemological-paradigm based on essentialist and naturalized foundations, then we have no normative criteria nor epistemological-political subjects to judge codes, practices and political subjects, as we have no possibility of social criticism, political changing and cultural inclusion, because they need an institutionalized and universal epistemological-moral paradigm and institutionalized epistemological-moral subjects. Now, in the Western institutional tradition, this problem was solved by the link between objectivity and institutionalization, between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism. Indeed, in this case, the link between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism represents, in the first place, the fact of the mutual dependence between institution and objectivity, that is, there is no epistemological-moral objectivity without the philosophical-theological-scientific institution, as there is no institution without its power to ground and to justify objectively the epistemological-moral values, codes and practices. In the second place, such interdependence between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism means that epistemological-moral objectivity has a very universal sense and range, becoming essentialist and naturalized: here, despite the particular-singular localization of any culture-society, despite the fact that we are, according to Hegel, sons of our time, universalism implies the same human nature which is beyond contextualism, which can serve as medium among all cultures-societies-peoples. Such a universal epistemological-moral basis represented by human nature becomes both a normative paradigm and an institutional matter-praxis.³

³ That can be seen in the documents resulted from the II Vatican Council, especially in some of its dogmatic constitutions and decrees, namely: Dogmatic Constitution Lumen Gentium, p. 37-117; Decree Unitatis Redintegratio, p. 307-332; Decree Ad Gentes, p. 349-399.

Now, here appears the correlation and dependence between strong institutionalism and strong objectivity. Such a universal epistemological-moral paradigm represented by human nature is developed, unveiled and achieved by an institutional praxis which depurates common sense’s pluralism of opinions, practices and beliefs, as it depurates common people’s multiplicity of epistemological-moral subjects by the centrality of the philosophical-theological-scientific institution itself with its internal self-authorized staff, practices, codes and values. If the truth of common sense is partial and fragile because of the plurality of epistemological-moral subjects which is proper to common people, on the other hand, the philosophical-theological-scientific institution furnishes and streamlines a very univocal and universalistic epistemological-moral paradigm with no internal contradictions and, therefore, with an internal consistency and coherence, from here becoming universal, valid for everyone and in all times-contexts. By strong objectivity we mean a kind of essentialist and naturalized foundation which is based on a notion of human nature that is always universal, always valid for everyone and in all times-contexts, as we said above, the same as it presupposes and imposes that objectivity is the condition for pluralism-particularity, the justification as being only possible by objectivity, by universalism. Now, by strong institutionalism we mean the fact that institution, in the moment it—and only it—unveils such an essentialist and naturalized foundation, has the legitimacy and the power to centralize and monopolize the constitution, the legitimation and the social foment of this notion of human nature, of this conception of essentialist and naturalized foundation.

By centralizing and monopolizing the foundation, the streamlining and the public foment of the epistemological-moral objectivity, the institution becomes the supreme judge, guide and criteria to common sense and to common people, and this also means the fact that the institution’s universal epistemological-moral paradigm becomes the basis from which common sense’s axiological pluralism and common people’s multiple particular epistemological-political subjects are framed, controlled and oriented over time. The correlation between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism implies that the truth, the objective or universal truth belongs to institutions; it is reached by institution and from institutionalization, so these situations give to institutions a very central epistemological-political-normative power, core and role in terms of societal constitution, legitimation and evolution. That is the reason why, in Western culture, the
in institutionalization based on a model of human nature (essentialist and naturalized foundations) became the very epistemological-political-normative center of society. Institutionalism—strong institutionalism—gives the fundamental principles, practices and codes on which sociability is based, streamlined and guided over time. Likewise, the institutional epistemological-political subjects become the very central subjects of societal-cultural-epistemological constitution, legitimation and evolution, so that they—and basically they—determine the basic rules, practices and codes from which the other common people’s particular epistemological-political subjects can act. Strong institutionalism means the centralization and the monopolization inside institutions of the epistemological-political-normative foundations, as of the epistemological-political subjects, by the fact that the epistemological-moral objectivity is a matter-praxis which is only possible to be achieved by institution’s internal proceduralism, codes, practices and legal staff. The truth is univocal and the philosophical-theological-scientific institution takes it into account, it performs that.

Finally, we arrive at the fact of the mutual support and legitimation between philosophy-theology-science, politics and education, in the sense that philosophical-theological-scientific institutions allow to political-educational institutions the objective knowledge and the normative content based on essentialist and naturalized foundations, based on a model of human nature from which political-educational institutions can perform and guide the processes of socialization and subjectivation, which are institutionalized, which become institutionalized. Here, in the first place, there is a correlation between institutional scientific praxis, institutional political power and the institutionalized educational activity, that is, the fact that the institutionalization of knowledge gives political-normative power to philosophical-theological-scientific institutions in terms of political-educational programming, orientation and framing. In the second place, that correlation means the possibility of standardization of the multiple common people’s epistemological-political subjects by one institutional form of epistemological-political subject which is the universal model of regulation and performance of the processes of socialization and subjectivation—here, political-educational institutions gain sense and can ground their praxis regarding the common sense’s multiple values, practices and codes, as concerning common people’s plurality of epistemological-political-normative subjects. In the third place, therefore, philosophical-theological-scientific institutions, by putting a universal epistemological-moral paradigm as condition to contextualism-particularism, emphasize a kind of institutional grounding and praxis which is both highly closed-
authoritarian regarding the common people’s plurality of epistemological-moral subjects, and strongly standardized, unidimensional and even blind concerning the common sense’s multiple epistemological-moral values and practices. Here the institution’s beauty and tragedy come to light.

**The voices of the differences and the essentialist and naturalized foundations**

Indeed, for example, the problem of negation of differences by the correlation between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism founded on and fomenting essentialist and naturalized foundations gains sense from this double characteristic of Western institutional culture, namely (a) the mutual support between institutional science, institutional politics and institutional education, based on—we repeat once more—essentialist and naturalized foundations or on a model of human nature as the normative core and principle of/for institutional grounding and praxis, as of/for the societal evolution over time, guided from institutionalism; and (b) the institutional imposition of a very standardized and unidimensional process of simplification and homogenization of the differences by this universal and univocal model of human nature which is proposed as the fundamental ground for socialization and subjectivation, again conducted and determined from institutionalism. The same can be said about Western colonialism as dependent on the correlation between normative, cultural and religious justifications and material power and destruction, that is, the imbrication and mutual dependence between the cross and the sword shows that the philosophical-theological-scientific institution’s normative justification from essentialist and naturalized foundations (the cross) has served as epistemological-political basis to political institutions (the sword) in their process of conquest and acculturation of America’s and Africa’s native peoples (see Dussel, 1993; Todorov, 1993; Rawls, 1996; Habermas, 1998; Collins, 2006). In other words, Western culture’s double basis, that is, the correlation between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism from the affirmation of essentialist and naturalized foundations as the normative condition of the differences, and the mutual support between philosophical-theological-scientific institutions, political institutions and educational institutions, this double basis led to the deletion or minimization of the importance of the differences, which were-are...
subsumed by universal epistemological-moral paradigms sustained and streamlined from closed, autonomous, self-referential and self-subsistent institutions.

What we can perceive here—and this cannot be forgotten—is the intrinsic and mutual justification between epistemology and politics, between a universal normative paradigm and the institutional political praxis. All political actions are performed from epistemological justifications and it signifies that an institutional political imposition of a process of cultural homogeneity depends on a normative justification which presupposes a notion of human nature that is associated with a very singular characteristic of all humans, even if many of these humans do not have it effectively. Now, if many social groups or individuals have not such a singular characteristic of human nature, or if they have it in a degenerated or partial sense, then political-educational institutions find support in the philosophical-theological-scientific institutions for a work of imposition of ways of life, which offers that normative basis and, as a consequence, furnishes the normative paradigm and the steps-methodologies from which the formative processes can be instituted as a whole. What do we want to mean with that? We want to mean, first, exactly the very correlation between epistemology and politics as between scientific institutions and political-educational institutions; in second place, we want to mean that an essentialist and naturalized basis empowers a universal normative paradigm to serve as basic criterion to the framing and orientation of all particularities. Now, the tension between universalism and contextualism-particularism is a direct consequence of that, because essentialist and naturalized foundations frequently ignore and subsume the differences’ specificities and particularities which cannot be embraced, unidimensionalized and standardized at all by a unique universal and normative principle (see RAWLS, 1996, p. 03-13; HABERMAS, 1998, p. 03-48; COLLINS, 2006, p. 47-48; RORTY, 2010, p. 13).

Now, it is here that we want to introduce Pope Francis’s attitude “Who am I to judge?” Indeed, such an attitude of epistemological-political moderation is streamlined by two basic points—one of them constituted by essentialist and naturalized foundations, another associated with the differences and their multiplicity of epistemological-political codes, practices and subjects. On the one hand, an essentialist and naturalized foundation (a) puts the universal epistemological-moral paradigm as the basis of the differences’ constitution and sense, as it (b) subsumes all differences into one same normative basis which is more central than the differences themselves. From here, (c) institutions can frame and homogenize these differences from a unique model of foundation and criticism. On the other hand, the differences institute the
plurality of epistemological-political subjects, codes and practices as the fundamental ground of human life, so that the differences themselves constitute the real condition, the real state of human flourishing over time. From here, therefore, it is very difficult—sometimes there is even an impossibility—to ground a universal epistemological-moral paradigm from which all differences are framed, criticized and guided. In other words, Pope Francis’s “Who am I to judge?” was said in a context of a very hard tension between essentialist and naturalized foundations versus the differences’ plurality of epistemological-political subjects, codes and practices. More: this expression was said in a context of weakening of the essentialist and naturalized foundations by the consolidation of the epistemological-political centrality of the differences. This question, finally, may also mean an institutional defense of the necessary weakening of the essentialist and naturalized foundations as normative basis for institutions’ paradigmatic constitution, social linking and political intervention.

First of all, Pope Francis speaks in the name of an institution—he is not only a singular person, but, in this case, an institution, The Pope, The Catholic Church’s Head. As an institution, he must face the fundamental 21st century challenge for institutionalized religions, which is the tension between, on one side, the correlation between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism, and, on the other side, the differences’ normative subjects and claims. As an institution, Pope Francis must respond to the differences about the institutional constitution, legitimation and evolution from an essentialist and naturalized foundation that homogenizes all differences from a single principle-code associated with human nature as a whole. The case of homosexuality, that was the question about which Pope Francis said his “Who am I to judge?” is the example par excellence of this tension between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism versus the differences’ plurality of epistemological-political codes, practices and subjects. Traditionally, homosexuality—sexual, existential and normative life; the marriage between same sex people; the adoption of children by homosexuals; the redefinition of the notion of gender—was a praxis framed by institutionalized religions’ essentialist and naturalized foundations, which led to unidimensional and homogenized institutional practices of educational-cultural formation about gender and sexuality, as to an institution’s unidimensional form of epistemological-political guiding of people as a whole, despite this very basic human constitution (as primordial as heterosexuality), influencing and supporting a model of
culture highly based on a binary and excluding notion of gender-sexuality with a-historical and essentialist and naturalized senses, and defined as the very condition of human nature in biological, religious and moral terms, determined once and for all (from biological, religious and moral arguments). So, here, the institutions' normative basis was-is exactly a notion of human nature grounded on essentialist and naturalized foundations which both empowers institutions to intervene into pluralism in order to frame it from a strong epistemological-moral objectivity and subsumes the differences into a very standardized objective and normative notion of human life and human constitution. Here, the differences' specificities and needs are not so important, but the very epistemological-moral objectivity, the very human nature, centralized and monopolized by institutions.

Here it appears a double context from which such Pope Francis’ affirmation can be situated and streamlined in all of its consequences. We can call this double context as a normative-political challenge and a historical moment of Church — by the way, they are totally referred to and dependent on each other, as we will show soon. The normative-political challenge is given by the fact of pluralism, using Rawls’ terms, by the idea of a post-metaphysical age-thinking, now using Habermas’ words. What does this mean? The contemporary times are the times of the differences, of the pluralism, meaning that that otherness is the fundamental starting point and even the final point of constitution, legitimation and evolution of nowadays societies, especially democratic ones. Anyway, from the centrality and protagonism of pluralism we have the consolidation of democratic forms of life, thinking and grounding, as of values, symbols and practices, that moderate and minimize the power of essentialist and naturalized foundations in terms of determining and orienting with no mediations the social life as a whole. The same way, the direct consequence of pluralism is the framing of the correlation of strong institutionalism, strong objectivity and fundamentalism that has characterized Western institutional culture along time. In this case, institutions — religious, cultural and political ones — have centralized and monopolized the legitimation and orientation of social dynamics and political-cultural subjects exactly by the association between institutionalization and scientism, as by the intrinsic dependence among science (or religion, or theology), politics and education, imposing vertically, from top to bottom, a standardized, massified and unidimensional model of human nature for all and in all conditions, ignoring, minimizing of even denying the pluralism. From such religious and cultural institutions’ model of human nature grounded on essentialist and naturalized foundations, political and educational
institutions, as public-political culture, have been acting based on a normalized pattern of socialization-subjectivation conceived as a summation of biology and theology, both sustaining each other. Now, the Weber’s rationalization of metaphysical-religious images of world, which is the central characteristic of Western modernization, leads gradually to the centrality of democratic politics and a secular ethics that weaken institutional religions and push them to private sphere. Here, religion and religious institutions continue having social, cultural and political protagonism, but they must live from now on with the very fact of the differences as the fundamental core, value and dynamics of social, political, cultural and institutional constitution, legitimation and evolution, a condition that cannot be erased, ignore or violated.

Then we have the historical context of Pope Francis’ affirmation “Who am I to judge?”. It is demarcated and streamlined by the idea of reform of the Church, that Pope Francis was intending since he is the head of the Church. This kind of reformism has as purpose a more open and profound contact with society, and led him to defend directly an internal openness to public opinion about problems and challenges faced by Church. The idea is very clear and surprising: an internal institutional correction and reformism demand openness to public opinion, to democratic culture. As consequence, one of the more important steps and actions regarding this reformism is exactly the explicit and pungent contact with the matter of differences, of pluralism, and, here, with the fact of the present and future of religious institutions — based on the correlation of strong institutionalism, strong objectivity and fundamentalism — relatively to pluralism. Pluralism demands weakening or even abandonment of some parts of essentialist and naturalized bases that constitute religious institutions and the public culture influenced and oriented by them. Pluralism demands a movement of overcoming of the institutions’ vertical and direct imposition to society as a whole of theological-biological values and practices, with no mediations or moderation. Finally, the differences point to the consideration of the social particularities and contingencies, as of the singularities of cultural subjects, which should put down the massification, the standardization and unidimensionalization of forms of life from the imposition of an single essentialist and naturalized basis as the own effective universal form of life for all. One example of this can be represented by the XIV Synod of Bishops, which was streamlined and has finalized its activities with the conclusion of the correlation and dependence between biology and theology, that is, with the correlation of (a) physiological body and (b)
cultural identity of gender and sexuality, situation which is sustained by the own (c) theological interpretation of biology as a divine imposition with an a-historical structuration\. Therefore, in this situation, the XIV Synod of Bishops assume and emphasize the mutual support of theology, biology and culture as basis of its comprehension, framing and orientation of contemporary social life, which led again to a model of strong institutionalism based on a notion of strong objectivity imposed in a fundamentalism way to society as a whole, without consideration of the singularities proper to the differences. It is from here that Pope Francis’ encyclical document Amoris Laetitia (we consider it as a direct consequence of that affirmation “Who am I to judge?”) finds its sense and basis, that is, confronting this correlation of strong institutionalism, strong objectivity and fundamentalism with the fact of differences, of pluralism, which means also the questioning of the framing, legitimation and comprehension of public culture from the mutual dependence of theology and biology, situation that leads do a standardized, a-historical and massified model of human nature and of society-culture that erases and ignores the singularities which constitute social life, ever and forever.

Now, it is a hard tension, a very explosive relationship between institutionalized religions and the differences, exactly because of this institutional affirmation-imposition of a unidimensional essentialist and naturalized foundation which contrasts with the differences’ plurality of epistemological-political-normative subjects, practices and values. It is a hard tension, finally, due to the fact that institutionalized religions are mass religions, having a very powerful cultural-political influence which streamlines both the mass movements-consciousness and the political praxis of political parties and religious leaders: here, mass actions and institution’s political intervention regarding the differences become a natural consequence of this huge religious institutional political-cultural power to ground mass behaviors and to influence political and cultural leaders and movements. Therefore, Pope Francis’s attitude, “Who am I to judge?,” allows

---

4 Today, a very important cultural challenge is posed by “gender” ideology which denies the differences and reciprocity in nature of a man and a woman and envisages a society without gender differences, thereby removing the anthropological foundation of the family. This ideology leads to educational programmes and legislative guidelines which promote a personal identity and emotional intimacy radically separated from the biological difference between male and female. Consequently, human identity becomes the choice of the individual, which can also change over time. According to our faith, the differences between the sexes bears in itself the image and likeness of God (Gen 1: 26-27).


criticism regarding this unidimensional and univocal notion of human nature which is directly associated with an essentialist and naturalized foundation centralized and monopolized by philosophical-theological-scientific institution. As a consequence, it also enables criticism concerning the institutional political-cultural intervention into societal constitution, legitimation and evolution, in order to bring to light the differences’ epistemological-political-normative centrality in terms of social grounding and development. We have here a tension that is very hard (it was always hard!), of course, but also that could be a very productive one for the 21st century: indeed, as we are arguing insistently in this paper, the clashes between institution’s essentialist and naturalized foundations and the differences’ plurality of epistemological-political subjects, practices and values could lead to a very positive renewal of the social-political institutions in general and of the religious institutions in particular, from the recognition of the differences’ epistemological-political-normative centrality, which would conduct to a very fruitful cooperation and dialogue between institutions and differences’ epistemological-political subjects.

But there is a very fundamental condition for that fruitful cooperation and dialogue between institutions and differences which is the institutional weakening of the essentialist and naturalized foundations, or even the institutional abandonment of some parts of this essentialist and naturalized foundations. Indeed, as we think, that is the very institutional epistemological-political step to the facing of the violence against the differences, which finds institutional normative support, even if indirectly. Now, the institutional weakening of the essentialist and naturalized foundations means an institution’s double epistemological-political attitude: first, the weakening or even the abandonment of some parts of these essentialist and naturalized foundations; second, the institution’s public and open epistemological-political condemnation of the use of the religious codes and practices to frame and to deny the differences’ rights, claims and integrity, by fanatic social groups and individuals. In the first case, the institutional weakening of the essentialist and naturalized foundations could minimize, change or even abandon essentialist and naturalized notions of gender, sexuality and family in order to promote and to protect the differences’ forms of gender, sex, family, love etc.  

---

5 It is very serious – we repeat again – that the Synod of Bishops has concluded its XIV Ordinary General Assembly about the Catholic doctrine of the family with the very reinforcement and emphasis on the criticism against the “gender ideology” as leading to the deletion of biological differences between male and female, Rev. Pistis Prax., Teol. Pastor., Curitiba, v. 11, n. 2, p. 413-437, maio/ago. 2019
That institutional changing-renewal would not bring an end to institutionalized religions’ normative centrality, but, on the contrary, it would relieve these institutionalized religions of a very hard, inglorious and sad task, which is the totalizing and unidimensional control of all gender, sexual, familial and love practices, codes and subjects, something that no one (even a religious institution) can do effectively without a great deal of violence against these differences—in this sense, we must learn that essentialist and naturalized foundations and a universal model of human nature do not work all moments and for all differences, which requires their weakening and moderation as the democratic openness and inclusion of the differences by institutions.

In the second case, it is a fact that fanatic social groups, which have an essentialist and naturalized comprehension of the creed, and of its political-cultural intervention and framing, use these institutional essentialist and naturalized foundations in a very selective way to deny and to face the differences’ epistemological-political subjects, practices and values. For example, the Ku-Klux-Klan is a racist and fundamentalist North-American cultural-religious group that uses biology and religions for racist intentions and purposes. The Islamic State is the very radicalized version of many fanatic social groups and individuals (not only in Islamism, but also in the Catholicism, as the Ku-Klux-Klan), which uses religious codes and practices to destroy the differences, to influence juridical-political institutions from essentialist and naturalized foundations in order to affirm culturally, politically, juridically and constitutionally a unidimensional form of life, of subject and of grounding as the basis of societal constitution, legitimation and evolution—we could cite here the Brazilian evangelical or neopentecostal churches and their religious leaders that are very close to political parties and their authorities, correlation and mutual support which openly and publicly allow and perform a fight against the differences’ subjects, rights and claims in the Congress and even in the public-political sphere, associating political praxis with a religious messianic crusade which directly and furiously attacks the differences’ epistemological-moral

which are the image and likeness of God himself (§ 08). So, from here, it is necessary to institutionally, culturally promote the biological sexual differences, because the gender ideology leads to their deletion, which is an absurd, a disrespect regarding the essentialist and naturalized foundations which constitute human nature. Now, as we are arguing in the paper, that is a very dangerous epistemological-political-normative step-principle-practice from which the fanatic groups can find institutional legitimation to their violent crusades against the differences and against inclusion. About the Synod of Family, see the final document resulting of such assembly above cited: <http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/synod/documents/rc_synod_doc_20151026_relazione-finale-xiv-assemblea_en.html>.
“degeneration,” “depravity.” Now, it is also a fact that religious institutions not always accomplish an open and public criticism against the dogmatic use of the essentialist and naturalized foundations by fanatic groups. In many situations, religious institutions do not openly and publicly speak against and combat the uncritical and very selective use of essentialist and naturalized foundations by these fanatic groups, both in Islam and Christianity, citing two big world institutionalized and universalist religions. As a consequence, the violence against the differences from the use of essentialist and naturalized foundations by fanatic groups can happen without religious institutions’ opposition and condemnation. Now, terrorism and violence against the differences are very dangerous problems for contemporary times; and in order to solve them, the religious institutions must speak publicly and openly against them, against the use of religious codes, texts and practices assumed by fanatic groups to ground the violence against the differences. Here again the correlation between institutional weakening of the essentialist and naturalized foundations (or even the abandonment of some parts of them) and the institutional public political praxis in defense of the differences and against fanaticism will certainly lead to the strengthening of the plurality, of the cultural-political democracy from the very religion institutions. That is the example and the praxis of Pope Francis in all of his statements, especially his last very explosive encyclical Amoris Laetitia as a counterpoint to the 14th Synod of Bishops’ renewal of an essentialist and naturalized foundation and basis for understanding, legitimation and framing of gender and sexual contexts, practices, values and subjects. Speaking about the impossibility and the danger of a totalizing and unidimensional paradigmatic application into the pluralism of an essentialist and naturalized basis, practices and values by religious institutional staffs, he said:

This offers us a framework and a setting which help us avoid a cold bureaucratic morality in dealing with more sensitive issues. Instead, it sets us in the context of a pastoral discernment filled with merciful love, which is ever ready to understand, forgive, accompany, hope, and above all integrate. That is the mindset which should prevail in the Church and lead us to open our hearts to those living on the outermost fringes of society (Pope Francis, 2016, § 312, p. 242-243).

In other words, according to Pope Francis, the pluralism and the differences must be threatened in their singularities, which means both the impossibility of a universalistic paradigm subsuming, embracing and standardizing all subjects, practices and values from a univocal and massified, essentialist and naturalized basis, as the
consequent necessity of moderation and of weakening of this essentialist and naturalized basis in terms of its comprehension, grounding and application to the differences as a whole. Now, as we think, the 21st century is the century of an unsurpassable epistemological-political challenge to institutions, their normative grounds, social-cultural linking and political intervention. More: it is the century of the differences; it is a moment in which the differences’ plurality of epistemological-political subjects, codes and practices become normatively and socially hegemonic, very central to the societal and institutional constitution, legitimation and evolution (see Habermas, 1998, p. xxv-xxvi, p. 51-52; Honneth, 1995, p. 01-02, p. 163-165; Forst, 2002, p. 121-132).

Now, here, in the clashes between institutions and the differences, between essentialist and naturalized foundations versus the epistemological-political relativism and democratic openness made possible by pluralism, finally between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism versus the weakening or the abandonment of the essentialist and naturalized foundations, it is from here that the tensions and the emancipatory epistemological-political praxis for a new world will be grounded on and constructed. And that is the moment of an institutional change from the normative centrality of the differences, from the very important contribution that these differences can give to institutions. So, new religious institutions for new times, for the times of the differences, is the motto from which institutionalized and universalist religions can think and criticize both the strong objectivity of the epistemological-moral contents and the strong institutionalism which is based on the institutional centralization and monopolization of the constitution, grounding and streamlining of those essentialist and naturalized foundations. In the first case, the differences’ plurality of epistemological-political subjects, practices and values shows that it is impossible to construct a strict model of human nature and to frame from it all differences; in the second case, the institutional construction, legitimation and social foment of the doctrine-creed-knowledge must be discussed with believers and non-believers from an institutional openness to an inclusive and participative praxis that can lead to the valuing of the differences as the consequence of human freedom and equality, as the consequence of human development, which means, we repeat, the weakening of the essentialist and naturalized foundations (or even the abandonment of some parts of them), as the institutional refusal of a strict strong objectivity and of a closed strong institutionalism regarding the political-cultural democracy.

In conclusion, we think that the fundamental institutional praxis in the 21st century, for our century, is the weakening of the essentialist and naturalized
foundations exactly from the epistemological-political centrality of the differences. And this means a quintuple point, as we are arguing throughout the paper: first, the institutional moderation regarding the affirmation and the use of the strong epistemological-moral objectivity in order to frame cultural practices and to intervene politically in the society; second, the institutional openness to an inclusive and participative democratic praxis in which believers and non-believers can discuss with institutional staffs the understanding, the changing and the social foment of the creed; third, the institutional public and open condemnation of the fanaticism and the violence against the differences; fourth, as a consequence, the institutional affirmation of the epistemological-political centrality of these differences in institutional and societal terms; and fifth, in the time of the differences, only radical criticism and permanent activism (of the social subjects one each other and regarding institutions; of institutions concerning themselves) can resolve problems of social and political integration, which means that democracy inside institutions and in the public-political sphere, by all and for all, is what remains in the moment that pluralism is the societal-cultural-institutional basis. It is here that Pope Francis’s attitude, “Who am I to judge?,” can be situated consistently, since it represents the institution’s self-consciousness of its non-power, of its limitation, of its incapability to frame all particular subjects and situations from a unidimensional notion of human nature, from a strong epistemological-moral paradigm. This also represents the institution’s enlightenment about the possibility of a very dangerous use of essentialist and naturalized codes, practices and foundations by fanatic groups to deny the differences’ subjects, rights and practices. Moreover, that represents the positive institutional understanding about the differences and pluralism, and their fundamental contribution to society and to the institutions as a whole. So, “Who am I to judge?” is the most impactful institutional attitude-praxis we have seen in our young—and yet problematic—century, the most hopeful words we must expect of religious institutions and authorities in a moment that is characterized by the growth of the tensions between fanaticism and the differences. So, now, it is the institutional opportunity—for all religious, cultural and political institutions—to moderate their essentialist and naturalized foundations, to weaken the correlation between strong objectivity and strong institutionalism, and finally to publicly and openly defend the differences against fanaticism, emphasizing the differences’ epistemological-political plurality and the political-cultural democracy as the basis of societal and institutional
constitution, legitimation and evolution. That is the fundamental normative-political route for a peaceful, inclusive and participative new century, and it will only be reached from an institutional moderation regarding the essentialist and naturalized foundations, from an institutional openness to the differences’ epistemological-political subjects, values and practices, and finally from an institutional public defense of these differences against fanaticism, delegitimizing fanatic groups and their selective use of the creed’s essentialist and naturalized foundations to deny and to combat the differences.

That is not an easy task, as it is not a transitory practice, but exactly a hard and permanent posture of criticism, framing and struggle against the correlation of strong institutionalism, strong objectivity and apolitical, dogmatic and selective use of essentialist and naturalized practices, values and codes. Such Pope Francis’s affirmation is a very ethical light we must assume and use as the paradigmatic basis from which institutional internal changing and even the linking among religion, culture and politics can be remodeled and streamlined in order to take seriously and effectively the fact of the differences as the starting point and the final point of contemporary societies’ organization, legitimation and evolution. And the most important, concerning Pope Francis’ theology and orientation and managing of the Catholic Church, is that he is constructing a form of theological-political thought that is aware of the very problem constituted by that correlation of strong institutionalism, strong objectivity and fundamentalism in the nowadays world, in our current societies – and, of course, even to Catholic Church internal organization and life. His theological, ethical and political thought also is sensible to the challenges posed to such situation of democratic pluralism by the association of strong institutionalism, strong objectivity and fundamentalism. So, it is not a coincidence that his recent two encyclicals, Laudatio Si and Amoris Laetitia, assume this challenge and, therefore, put the moderation of the grounding and application of essentialist and naturalized foundations into the differences as the very basis of their developments, as the very basis of the theology, of its framing, legitimation and foment of the creed into the social world. As He said insistently, the gospel, as metaphysical-normative content-instrument used to interpret, frame and orienting the society, the world, is not like a weapon, like a stone that we assume to harm those who do not live in a perfect sense, all those who live in other ways of life than ours. The theology is not a weapon, but love, a normative set of values and practices concerned to a spiritual and ethical life oriented by religious institution (here emerges also the great responsibility of religious institutions in terms of social life); theology does not aim to harm, to destroy, but construct ethical, love,
peaceful and fair relations, connections and values, even if that means to minimize or abandon some parts of the creed, some practices, values and intentions supported and allowed by essentialist and naturalized foundations, as to resign of a pungent fundamentalist activism into public sphere and regarding the differences, the pluralism.

Now, ethics, a religious ethics to the contemporary world means exactly this, that is, not a weapon for death, not a paradigm to homogenize and massify the differences, not a crusade against the differences and pluralism, a crusade against a degenerated and impossible world, but, in truth, an open, charitable, inclusive and plural institutional, political and cultural framework for empowerment of democracy, of differences, of pluralism, which cannot be sustained and streamlined if the correlation of strong objectivity, strong institutionalism and fundamentalism is the basis from which the religious institution, the institutional creed and the institutional linking to politics, culture, education and public sphere is the blind and insensible essentialist and naturalized basis for internal and social religious institutional constitution, legitimation and evolution. Religious institutions and traditions can be reconstructed and changed gradually, without the destruction and the degeneration of the original Word or without the weakening and loss of importance of religious institutions and traditions – that is a great and unforgivable teaching that we can see and learn from Pope Francis’ Amoris Laetitia, which shows us the continuity and the importance of his speak “Who am I to judge?” regarding the religious institutional framing of the differences. Indeed, “Who am I to judge?” leads directly to the idea that Gospel is not a weapon, is not a stone, the same as the institutional staff is not an authoritarian judge which, seated, centralizing and monopolizing the Moses’ chair, can understand, judge and orient pluralism from top to bottom without sensibility, without moderation, without contact with the nowadays contingencies, contradictions, plurality. In other words, the institutional creed as the institutional correlation among religion, politics and culture cannot be imposed vertically to the differences without considering their particularities, contingencies and specificities. That is the present and future of religious institutions, that is, a dialectics between foundation and application of essentialist and naturalized foundations into pluralism that takes into account the differences and, therefore, moderates, sensitizes and awakens the correlation of strong institutionalism, strong objectivity and fundamentalism in order to protect, foment and promote the differences, the democracy. As Pope Francis says in Amoris Laetitia — by the way, let’s
us emphasize attention to this idea, that is, the happiness of love, the happiness of loving the other, a very basis of an ethical and, of course, democratic life, a life of openness, recognition, sensibility and moderation:

For this reason, a pastor cannot feel that it is enough simply to apply moral laws to those living in “irregular” situations, as if they were stones to throw at people’s lives. This would bespeak the closed heart of one used to hiding behind the Church’s teachings, “sitting on the chair of Moses and judging at times with superiority and superficiality difficult cases and wounded families” [...] “natural law cannot be presented as an already established set of rules that imposes themselves a priori on the moral subjects; rather, it is a source of objective inspiration for the deeply personal process of making decisions”. Because of forms of conditioning and mitigating factors, it is possible that in an objective situation of sin – which may be not subjectively culpable, or fully such – a person can be living in God’s grace, can love and can also grow in the life of grace and charity, while receiving the Church’s help to this end. Discernment must help to find possible ways of responding to God and growing in the midst of limits. By thinking that everything is black and white, we sometimes close off the way of grace and of growth, and discourage paths of sanctification which give glory to God (Pope Francis, 2016, § 305, p. 236-237).

Bibliographical references


