Natural Born Transhumans

Karina Silvia Pedace, Tomás Balmaceda, Diego Lawler, Diana I. Pérez, Maximiliano Zeller


This work promotes the thesis that humans are naturally transhuman. In order to achieve this, we present in the first two sections some examples of technological devices assembled to human beings, and we critically review the assumptions and dichotomies on which the idea of human enhancement is based according to the ordinary transhumanist vision. Thirdly, we present the thesis of the Extended Mind to support our intuition. Fourthly, we dismantle the most relevant philosophical dichotomies that structure the transhumanist position. Finally, we recapitulate the reasons why we should wake up from the transhumanist dream.


Transhumanism, Human Enhancement, Extended Mind, Prothesis, Artificial Intelligence.

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