Freud’s Chows. On transcendental stupidity: a case study

Os chows de Freud. Sobre a estupidez transcendental: um estudo de caso

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Abstract

This text explores the problem of transcendental stupidity in Sigmund Freud, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida’s works, seeking to combine it with (1) the paradoxical figure of Oedipus (the original complex) in psychoanalytical and philosophical tradition and (2) the symptomatic situation of some important animals [wolf and dog, symbols of wild and domestic life (i.e.: Freud’s Wolfs, Freud’s Chow-Chows)] in analyses and therapies. The case of the Man of the Wolves (der Wolfmann), the case of Mr. Sergei K. Pankejeff described in Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose, a fundamental dream in contemporary culture history, would be the point of departure.

Keywords: Dream. Oedipus. Stupidity. Family. Animals.

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Resumo

Este texto explora o problema da estupidez transcendental nos trabalhos de Sigmund Freud, Gilles Deleuze e Jacques Derrida, buscando combiná-lo com (1) a figura paradoxal de Édipo (o complexo original) na tradição psicanalítica e filosófica e com (2) a situação sintomática de alguns importantes animais [lobo e cão, símbolos da vida selvagem e da vida doméstica (i.e.: os lobos de Freud, os Chow-Chows de Freud)] em análises e terapias. O caso do Homem dos lobos (der Wolfmann), o caso de Mr. Sergei K. Pankejeff descreveu em Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose, um sonho fundamental na história da cultura contemporânea, seria o ponto de partida.


“Ah oui, Kipling comprenait mieux que Freud l’appel des loups”.
(G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, Mille Plateaux)

“How you expect to run with the wolves come night when you spend all day sparring with the puppies?”
(O. Little, The Wire)

Wolf is coming!

Everybody knows Aesop’s fable about the shepherd boy, the sheep and the Wolf (“Ποιμνὶ παίζω”: No. 210, Aesopica): a young pastor warns many times that the Wolf is coming (“Wolf is coming!” is the phrase he repeats). All the peasants come to his aid. But, in fact, it turns out to be a joke. The joke is played repeatedly by the shepherd boy. But finally the wolf does really come, fair and square, when nobody is awaiting for it. However, farmers, who had learnt the lesson well after suffering several times the heavy joke from the stupid shepherd
boy, did not attend his distress call in spite of the fact that he went on shouting, perhaps stronger than ever, the same phrase ("Wolf is coming!"). Thus, the wolf, which certainly can come at any time, the wolf, the figure of what should never be taken as a joke, eats without resistance, devours, opening that black mouth that accumulates the most terrible phobias of the human imagination in the most diverse cultures, the sheep. The moral is well known: nobody believes the liar, not even when he tells the truth. It matters, however, little this time: lie will not be our theme, although you never know (the liar paradox) when lie is a theme, and less you know when is it "ours".

"To cry wolf", that in English means "giving a false alarm", can just become, too late, its opposite: the wolf might eventually arrive, but there will be no one to stop it. J. Derrida, despite of the fact that he quotes several times the Fables of La Fontaine, does not refer to this classic scene of folk tales. He doesn’t quote it, but it seems to be constantly present by way of an Apocalypse without Apocalypse (Not Apocalypses not now) along several of his writings, and, in particular, vol. I of the Seminar La bête et le souverain; as present or more than the “à pas de loup” which provides the tone right after the start of the first session. It will be recalled. Somehow, we could say that Derrida has done everything possible, or, precisely, the impossible, without Kantian prerogatives, so that wolves never come, in spite of the fact that a scene of Wolves à venir, a feeling that the wolves are close, hanging around the house, hiding behind the fir trees of the taiga, cannot give the tone of many of the things that he has written: lucidity consists, certainly, in glimpsing the permanent possibility of war (Lévinas dixit). And if the Wolf has taught something for centuries it is the requirement of having a gun-in-hand. Thus Wolves come (not so much “the end is coming”, exemplary apocalyptic phrase, as “the wolves are coming”: some alliance of destiny, the end and destruction), they are coming, approaching, and they do it in “Wolves’ steps”, quietly. But they will do so (in this preset tour I’m going to propose by throwing anchor in some islets of this seminar) from the dog: from the becomings of the dog.

I quote, in first instance, the canine scene that is going to introduce the establishment of the step and to condense in some way the
rest of the movements that I will propose to work in a series of more or less psychoanalytic situations. It’s a choppy paragraph taken from Chapter 2 of *Mille Plateaux. Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2* (“1914. Un seul ou plusieurs loups?”) by Deleuze and Guattari:

That day the Wolfmann [the famous case collected by Freud] rose from the divan especially tired. He knew that Freud had the genius to graze the truth and ignore it [*passer à côté*], and also to fill the voids through associations. He knew that Freud knew nothing of wolves nor asses. Freud only understood what was a dog and a dog’s tail. That’s not enough, would not be enough [...] The Wolfmann will never be able to speak. Even if he talks of wolves, or howls like a Wolf, Freud not even listen, watches his dog and responds “it’s Daddy” [*regarde son chien et répond “c’est papa”*]. [...] The Wolfmann continues screaming: six or seven wolves! Freud responds: what? Kids [*chevreaux*]? How interesting, if I remove the kids there remains a Wolf, it has to be your father. That’s why the Wolfmann feels so tired (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1980, p. 38, 51, 52).

**Doggy Therapies, or about the canine-analysis**

Apparently, Freud’s office smelt of cigar and dog. Gary Genosko tells it this way: I can not imagine any worse environment for the clinical practice of confession. I don’t know if owners of “Freud Museum” in London or the “Sigmund Freud Museum” in Vienna will continue to maintain the atmosphere. Maybe yes: to meet the wishes of the authenticity-hungry tourists. But it is true: dogs were not alien to Freud. At the end of his life (1930-1937) he had a Chow-Chow in the office, Jo-Fi, sister of Lun-Yug, who had died a couple of years earlier (see EDMUNDSON, 2007, p. 91). Jo-Fi was known to patients as was present in some consultations. After them, already in London, Lün arrived, who would have lived with Jo-Fi at the beginning to be subsequently given and, finally, twist of fate, after the death of Jo-Fi, be recovered by Freud. These lion-like dogs of purple-blue tongue, favorite animals of Chinese Emperors, have not gone into the contemporary cultural history simply for the passionate comments by the father of psychoanalysis.
or the several photos in which one sees Freud accompanied by any of these animals. Marie Bonaparte, French psychoanalyst, Princess of Greece and Denmark, had written a book about his Topsy Chow-Chow (Topsy, chow-chow au poil d’Or) translated by Sigmund and Anne Freud, his daughter, to German. In one of those famous photos, Freud and probably the last two bitches are posing. They would resemble, at least at first sight, the dog cited by M. Heidegger in one of the greatest moments of his Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (1929-30 seminar), the domestic dog climbing stairs; they would belong equally, if we use the classification of Ch. Baudelaire in his Spleen de Paris, to the “bad dog” group (“boastful dog, that conceited four-legged animal, Danish, Pekingese, Bulldog or poodle [or Chow-Chow], so happy to own”): those dogs that throw themselves against the visitors just when the door opens demanding a caress.

In the photos, and in the text by Deleuze and Guattari cited earlier, it is without a doubt the domestic family dog: it’s the house law and the Oedipal-family, if this adjective were appropriate, and not merely tautological. From the fragment collected the phrase “the only thing Freud understood was what was a dog, and a dog’s tail” stands out. Were they referring to Chow-Chows? It’s very probable [I repeat: “as much as [the Wolfmann] talks of wolves, that he howls like a Wolf, Freud does not even listen, he watches his dog (there is, it will be recalled, at least one more explicit photo of Freud himself with his dog in the consultation) and responds “It’s daddy”]. But, following the psychoanalytic chain and certain recognizable symptomatic value, they maybe also referring to Justine, the “très belle” boxer bitch of Jacques Lacan (LACAN, 2005, p. 227; see DERRIDA, 2008, p. 200). It is not possible to ignore this chain between the biographical and thematic, or speculative, within the rhythmic variation caused by the many sarcastic remarks that they direct not only to the founder of psychoanalysis, but to the psychoanalytic in general, throughout the book. But, first and foremost, of course, Deleuze and Guattari are doing, in particular, a brief reading of the case of the Man of the Wolves (der Wolfmann), the case of Sergei K. Pankejeff described in Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose, and, in general, are assisting the operation of replacing a Wolf,
the vision of several wolves in a dream (because wolves are plural, they move, they hunt, they kill, they eat in herds), by a dog in a psychoanalytic analysis (it is therefore also a matter of method: of access to life). This phrase will also be recalled: “Freud tried to approach crowd phenomena from the point of view of the unconscious, but didn’t see clear, did not see that the unconscious was fundamentally a crowd” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1980, p. 42).

It is well known that Sergei K. Pankejeff (der Wolfmann) would have dreamed of six or seven static white wolves with dog ears and fox tails, sitting on the branches of some walnut trees, who watched him carefully, having been crouched in his childhood for an image, probably extracted from Red Riding Hood according to the own Pankejeff (see GARDINER, 1981, p. 23-24), of a Wolf that her sister maliciously had shown him with insistence. Of course, we could talk about little Red Riding Hood, appearing three times in the Seminary of Derrida, we could speak of the image of the Wolf as fierce-wolf, i.e. as a figure of the destruction and as a general metonymy of “manger l’autre” [because, for example, there are some interesting notes about the love of the Wolf (Cixous dixit) as desire to be eaten alive, a subject that Derrida developed already in some unpublished works at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the nineties from the analysis of the work of Kleist (Penthesilea, 1808); who knows if that was the most intimate and shameful desire of little Red Riding Hood, or Wolfmann’s himself; at the end, and after all, everyone knows that little Red Riding Hood is a “love story” with a tragic end], but I am not going to do it.

Before going into details, we can say the following: psychoanalysts, and Freud first, would be in charge of massacring (that is the word used by them, by Deleuze and Guattari) the “animal-becomings” of the child, being the dog (not as becoming, but as castrating analogy, as domestication, as paternalization; a kind of image freezing) and insulation or reduction of wolves that occurs the performed image of this massacre. The dog is here also sign of impoverishment, though in a different sense to the one in which it is treated, e.g. Heidegger in the cited Grundbegriffe, or in a important conference (Die Armut), published in French, and dedicated to Derrida, by Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe, on the
famous verses of Hölderlin [“wir sind arm geworden, um reich zu werden (we have become poor to be rich”)]. In other words: for Deleuze and Guattari, if psychoanalysis had paid attention to animal-becomings [wolf multiplicities in this case; animal becomings that must be understood, according to the lexicon of Deleuze and Guattari’s from the 1980s, not as identifications or imitations of the animal (is not, yet, before of doing the animal; is about following them), but as unique processes of leakage, as innovative differentiation events; for this we must always have present a zoologist who Deleuze appreciated much since his earliest works: Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire] instead of taming them (dog contractions: servility), if he were attentive to what is provided by his methods rather than going past or skipping (refusing) certain elementary situations, if they had at least “seen the ears of the Wolf” (but not to the castrating-wolf-father, but the herd at dawn on a day of hunting), he would have said or would say less stupidities (bêtises). It’s not therefore that psychoanalysts are fools or silly/stupid people (bêtes), although according to the Forest Gump mother, “stupid is as stupid does” (the mother of Forest discovered that folly was, first and foremost, a performative matter), but that they say and make nonsense or silly things, and that they make it especially when speaking of animals (bêtes). A silly question: is simply curious that one of the daughters of Freud, Anne, had a dog (had it so that it accompanied her in her walks), of the breed Alsatian Shepherd, named “Wolf”, breed of dog, commonly known as “Wolfhound (Wolfhunde)”, which was, as you know well, popularized by the nazis? A “nazi dog” named “Wolf” to watch a Jewish community. Genosko hit the nail on the head. This dog lived 11 years with the Freud family, from 25 to 36; and Freud, as again says Genosko in his interesting preface to the English edition of Topsy, said at one point that it was an “old gentleman” (see GENOSKO, 1994, p. 3). Otherwise, a funny scene with this Wolfdog is the one told by R. R. Grinker, a neurologist (founder of the school of psychoanalysis in Chicago) who, fascinated by the discoveries of Freud (there is a correspondence between the two), wanted to be analyzed by him, and said that, upon entering the House, feeling the snout of a Wolfhound against his genitals, he already felt the castration principle anxiety.
There is another scene of Grinker himself with Jo-Fi in which, this one, after saying Grinker something in the office, rapidly stands up and goes back to her genitals: Freud says that the dog is excited because he has discovered the source of his anxiety. Grinker would have then, and it could not be otherwise, his differences with Freud. But let leave this: it would lead us to other ways.

*Dances with Wolves, or on the partition of Oedipus*

The reason for this small rodeo is that the text by Deleuze and Guattari cited at the beginning about the dogs and the Wolves of Freud is quoted up, as it is known, by Derrida in the vol. I of *La bête et le souverain* along the fifth session (Jan. 30, 2002), which is almost entirely dedicated to the problem of the bêtise in Deleuze. These preliminary details seemed necessary. It’s one of the few times that Derrida comments a text of Deleuze, which is not just one issue among others. As is known, Derrida himself had written an important preface to the work of N. Abraham and M. Torok *Cryptonymie. Le Verbier de l’Homme aux loups* (1976), work that also revolves around *Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose*, and, above all, the material accumulated in the important book published in that time (*The Wolf-Man by the Wolf-Man*, M. Gardiner, 1971): “Fors Les mots angles of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok”, was the title of that important preface. The original text of Deleuze and Guattari (“Un seul ou plusieurs loups?”), even though it would be included in *Mille Plateaux* in 1980, predates the publication of *Cryptonymie: 1973* (*Minuit* No. 5). 1971, 1973, 1976, are the key dates. There are no references to this article by Deleuze and Guattari in the books by Abraham and Torok nor in Derrida’s preface. The article is approximately, and on the other hand, published a year after a book, *L’Anti-Œdipe* (1972), that, do not no forget it, was not received enthusiastically by Derrida; he had written to R. Laporte in a letter at the end of June 1972 that it was a “very bad book” (see PEETERS, 2010, p. 301). These also seem to be interesting data for the situations we have to deploy.
It seems therefore convenient to backdate the session of Derrida from January 30, 2002 at least until then: to the point where sarcasms against psychoanalysis start to be published by Deleuze (and Guattari, which Derrida does not mention throughout the entire session but to attribute him the co-authorship of the book when quoting the fragment), and at the beginning, let’s say, of this resistance that Derrida will confess in a statement that we will quote here: laughing with Deleuze for too long about what he says about psychoanalysis. Peeters, biographer of Derrida, even points out that *Glas* (1974; so many dates accumulate in little space) can also be read as a response to *L’Anti-Œdipe*, a book that would have really “exasperated” Derrida. “The family” as theme (family life as fundamental problem for psychoanalysis) is, for example, common in both books, although the treatment is very different, no less different to that received by “Psychoanalysis” throughout both works. But these are only major references, and it is not possible to go into it now. Already in the funeral note that Derrida writes on the death of Deleuze (“Il me faudra errer tout seul”), we observe, obviously in a different tone (it’s a generous gesture of admiration, of philosophical recognition towards an “inventor of philosophy”, “a great philosopher” and “a great professor”), this resistance against *L’Anti-Œdipe*. While Derrida will quote there, praising them, books as *Nietzsche et philosophie, Différence et Répétition* and *Logique du sens*, he will say that he had “murmured”, it is his word, against some propositions of *L’Anti-Œdipe* (see DERRIDA, 2003, p. 236). And, as you can read, that he would have made it known to Deleuze a day returning together driving from Nanterre, despite the fact that differences had never failed to place in their relationship but friendship (“ces différences n’ont pas laisse jamais place, entre nous, qu’à l’Amitié”) and intellectual affinity (“Deleuze reste sans doute, malgré tant de dissemblances, celui dont je me suis toujours jugé le plus proche parmi tous ceux de cette ‘génération’”). The scene of this return of Nanterre, which remains in suspension in the text he writes to Deleuze, was included more broadly by G. Schwab in the introduction to a book born of a Conference on Derrida, Deleuze and psychoanalysis which took place in Irvine. Derrida, at some point, I don’t know if sooner or later to a Conference that was
titled (it is important) “The Transcendental Stupidity (bêtise) of Man and the Becoming Animal according to Deleuze”, would have told the story with some detail during the Congress. Seven years have passed from the moment in which Derrida writes the funeral note (1995), announced the scene, until the moment that finally tells the story (2002). Schwab, I insist, transcribes the scene. Quote:

I resisted the way he [Deleuze] attacked psychoanalysis, and I didn’t want help. I remember once, the only moment I discussed this with Deleuze was... just after I published the *Anti-Œdipus*... Both of us were on the jury of a thesis at Nanterre... I Deleuze took back to Paris. I was driving. I was brief. I said: “Do you know *Anti-Œdipus*?” “No, I don’t have replied”. And that was all. Then we arrived to Paris (SCHWAB, 2009, p. 3).

It is not the place to analyze this scene. The universe of issues is again immense and intimidating, and here it is above all about the dogs and wolves cited by Derrida. But in order to know what is precisely played between dogs and wolves, in order to try to elucidate why Derrida quotes the fragment collected at the beginning and not any other (why does he start quoting the so-called nonsense/stupidity that Deleuze and Guattari attributed to psychoanalysis, recognizing them exclusively, but this was not any compliment, a knowledge about dogs, about their behavior (i.e., a canine ethology), nothing more symptomatic than this more or less comedic, more or less ironic, more or less informal and irrelevant daily scene. The same one, in the simplicity of the question (“do you know Anti-Oedipus?”), would probably reveal the unique (but wouldn’t be little) theoretical replica by Derrida to Deleuze: there isn’t something quite like the Anti-Oedipus, at least, it could be interpreted, not if the Anti-Oedipus is the other with respect to Oedipus according to a simple logic function (Hegelian: there is, as you know, a Hegelian Oedipus: the one which leads from Egypt to Greece, from darkness to light, from the animal to mankind) of the reversible opposition. It seems revealing the fact that Derrida says in an unpublished 1975 seminar (*La vie - la mort*) that Oedipus was a transition for him. And, later on, it is also revealing that he declared that he has
been unable to do a transition of Oedipus because he himself was the transition. But was this, an Anti-Oedipus as beyond of Oedipus, which Deleuze thought? Was this what Derrida intended to say to the steering wheel with who knows what tone and after listening to a strenuous thesis about the great love of Deleuze, Spinoza? The text preserved is a dictated remembrance of Derrida, many years after the scene and, in addition, in English. How would have it been like in French? Right now, although the question works the whole set of provisions, it seems unimportant, and I can not in any case enter into this. The question which I think is most important is that Derrida, and this wouldn’t be just anything, resists to laugh with Deleuze about psychoanalysis, or at least, refuses to play along with him for a long time. Thus, while in the early 1970s, one, Deleuze (together with someone who, by his side, would have triggered a great part of the game: Guattari), not only laughed but sarcastically railed against the foundations of the same (and particularly did it when he spoke, it is necessary to remember it, about animals), the other, Derrida, while continuing to destabilize some of its concepts (since 1966 with its major Conference on Freud and the scene of writing), will come to think (as he will show in États d’âme de la psychanalyse) that is psychoanalysis precisely the only one that can (and should) think something that is irreducible to life (to the animal; to that breath of life that is, since the Greeks, the psyche [Ψυχή] itself), namely: the phenomenon of cruelty. This is, broadly speaking, the general scenario of issues whose consideration seemed necessary.

**Taking note: a stupidity of G. Deleuze**

After these overall considerations, the private stage is the quote of that excerpt from Chapter 2 of *Mille Plateaux* in the reading of Wolfmann I mentioned before. But this fragment was not the first to be cited by Derrida in the vol. I of *La bête et le souverain*. Derrida, at the third session, began quoting another sentence from Chapter 5 of *Mille Plateaux*: “all those who love cats, dogs [one wonders: who? the Oedipal families? psychoanalysts or those who are potentially satisfied with their
analysis?], are assholes (*tous ceux qui aiment les chats, les chiens, sont des cons*)” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1980, p. 294). Well then: Deleuze and Guattari once again collect, in Chapter 5 of *Mille Plateaux*, the animals of psychoanalysis. It’s a chapter specifically dedicated to the definition of “animal-becoming”. Derrida will say:

> Au passage, Deleuze se rit de la psychanalyse quand elle parle des animaux, il s’en rit, comme il fait souvent, parfois un peu vite, et non seulement il s’en rit mais il dit, ce qui est plus drôle, que les animaux eux-mêmes en rient (DERRIDA, 2008, p. 104).

We would have to think carefully about this “sometimes a little fast”, because also *speed*, coming from a way of reading, would probably separate Derrida and Deleuze. Apart from that, I go on, Deleuze and Guattari, in spite of the fact that psychoanalysts have met numerous times the question of animal becomings in man, fail to understand it or have not been able to understand it. Derrida refers to it through a text also in the same chapter 5 a little bit later: “they have massacred the animal-becoming, in the man and in the child (*ils ont massacre le devenir-animal, chez l’homme et chez l’enfant*)” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1980, p. 317). It is, ultimately, of the *bêtise* of psychoanalysis, his ineptitude to understand, his refusal to understand what he would have to understand) when speaking of animals: “psychoanalysis is devoid of a truly Zoological vision”, said Deleuze and Guattari quoting a letter from the dissatisfied *Wolfmann* (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1980, p. 52); or in other words: “on dirait moins de bêtises sur la douleur, l’humiliation et l’angoisse dans le masochisme, si l’on voyait que ce sont les devenirs-animaux qui le mènent, et pas à l’inverse” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1980, p. 317).

Derrida, and I begin with development itself of the quotation in the text, is interested in three main things: (1) that wolves appear in the book (of them he was speaking since the first session of the seminar, an animal that is the protagonist of this vol. I of *La bête et le souverain*); (2) that the *bêtise* is quoted with regard to the relationship that would be maintained with the animal (*bêtise* which is the great theme, also, of
this vol. I of the seminar; Derrida even refers to this volume as “small teatrise on the bêtise”); and (3) that Deleuze laughs particularly at psychoanalysis when it comes to speak of animals. The three issues are then important. And the dogs are not just part of the scenery: they are, as mentioned, apart from the biographic dimension, the figurations of Oedipus, of the law of the House and the family institution: are “bad dogs", stupid or silly dogs. Only after putting all issues on the table, but through various maneuvers and strategies, ellipsis, bracket or rodeos, Derrida quotes the text in which the dogs had proper place: the chapter two of Mille Plateaux and the reading that I have already advanced, to provide the general context of problems of the Wolfmann. So therefore for Derrida (this would be the first movement) of completing what Deleuze says of the psychoanalytical bêtise according to a not-knowing to account for the multiplicity. Not recognizing the wolves (and not just the castration wolf, but the father that Freud places after the wolves, Freudian Wolf that would not really be a wolf but a kind of fierce-dog, mixed-Wolf or Siberian Huski), restoring the savage multiplicity of wolves, the pack of wolves, the dog, by its family unit is precisely making something silly, stupid: bête. This may be the sense (but this expression is particularly inappropriate in this story) of the beginning of the text, when it is said that Freud had the genius of grazing the truth and going past of it (maybe it could be said so: the Freudian “show” is, primarily, summoning up the “Chow”). Just when everything becomes interesting Freud, I insist on this, drawing the tangent line, would say nonsense/stupid through its “reducer jubilation” (the way that Freud would have for dealing with a multiplicity), he would make the fool. In general, it does not seem that Derrida have much objection to the precise question of ending the multiplicity in favor of the register of family restitution. In Glas, I repeat, this is also done, although in a different way. It is, it seems, a matter of ways (although in these ways a lot is really played). But, for example, it seems much more complicated that Derrida can follow the rather ambitious judgement relative to the truth or to the “actually Freud does not see or understand anything” of Deleuze and Guattari. However, the most interesting question does not lie simply in this matter, but in the reasons and tetic (positional)
beliefs that cause it [and which trigger libel, the style of “complaint”, “anti-requisitory”, “disortographic violence” of Deleuze and Guattari (see DERRIDA, 2008, p. 200)]. Here is where Derrida and Deleuze don’t seem to share the same judgement about psychoanalysis. In order to try to develop it, it is necessary to quote the other appearance of the word bêtise in the text by Deleuze. It is Différence et Répétition.

The own Derrida is who leads the auditorium to this appearance of the bêtise, thus drawing the second great movement of this reading. Here the context is even more complex. Deleuze wrote, without referring to the psychoanalysis: “la bêtise n’est pas l’animalité. L’animal est garanti par des formes spécifiques qui l’empêchent d’être bête” (DELEUZE, 2003, p. 196). Somewhat later, Deleuze writes: “la bêtise n’est jamais celle d’autrui, mais l’objet d’une question proprement transcendantale: comment la bêtise (et non l’erreur) est-elle possible”.

Regarding the first sentence, (1) Derrida rereads the importance of the reference to Schelling [extracted from the Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit... (1809)], a philosopher who would state what Deleuze would be saying about the bêtise (defined as failure in the indeterminacy of the depth), and the fact that it may not occur in animals due to some “specific forms”. It is here where, with determination, is inserted what seems the first destabilizing gesture of Derrida: Deleuze would not be defining with precision as regards these “specific forms”, i.e., would be doing (but Derrida, obviously, does not say this) a stupidity (a lack of determination) when referring to stupidity as the property of humans, he would be doing that according to the definition of bêtise that Deleuze himself provides; Derrida wonders: “À partir de quel moment une forme est-elle, en quelque sorte, explicite, et au fond à quelles formes Deleuze pense-t-il quand il désigne ici de façon si générale et indéterminée ‘les animaux’?”; this is, probably, the key reference. Deleuze attempts to isolate, in order to define it, the bêtise, but does so at the expense of generalizing and indeterminating. Now well, within this second retrospective movement (which is the, I would say, deconstructive movement), and even with regard to the first sentence, Derrida not only follows the track of Schelling showing some anthropocentric prejudice in the privilege of the human bêtise on the
part of Deleuze, but also keeps track of Flaubert, and does so in order to illustrate the words of Deleuze himself (see DERRIDA, 2008, p. 216). Places where he is lead by the clue, which “are not exactly Deleuze’s”, cause that the “illustration” can not avoid being, with all the possible discretion, an invitation, after which he reveals Schelling clue, “to take note”. Flaubert, about whom Derrida had published a beautiful text in 1980 (“Une idée de Flaubert: ‘la lettre of Plato’”), would have said two things relevant in the discourse about the bêtise that Derrida is stringing together around Deleuze (noting that Deleuze more than probably knew them), as if Deleuze was beginning to fall in a complex spider’s web, just to be devoured by a tarantula in the role (substitution) of fierce-wolf; the two issues of Flaubert would be: (a) that the bêtise spreads and (b) that the bêtise consists in wanting to conclude [letter to Bouilhet, Sept. 4, 1850 (see FLAUBERT, 1973, p. 679-680)]. Deleuze would fall into such a bêtise not only in relation to the reference to Schelling (to the lack of determination, to the generality), but also in the complement of Flaubert (to whom, I insist, this refers). But he would do it, what is more interesting, when following (2) the second sentence that we collected before saying that “la bêtise n’est jamais celle d’autrui”. Deleuze would get infected of the silliness or the stupidity, and would do so more than ever when (a) he falls in the generality of accusing others of doing a stupidity (denigration language, language of the accusation), when (b) falls in the indeterminacy of defining stupidity (a form of wanting to-conclude (see RONELL, 2003, p. 68), when (c) does not fall in the stupidity of considering that if the bêtise is never that of the other it can also be his bêtise (“contagion de la bêtise”). Now well, particularly Derrida, and this seems the crucial point, I insist on it, won’t fall (but you never know when you fall into the trap of the bêtise: no encyclopedic knowledge avoids it, rather, sometimes, the opposite happens (Bouvard et Pécuchet, 1881: misfortunes of absolute knowledge) into the trap of the bêtise: define it (say what is the silliness or stupidity) or accuse another of doing something stupid (you have made a stupid thing). Derrida does not accuse Deleuze at no time throughout the session, in spite of the fact that it can be read from what Derrida writes, the stupidity, one, of Deleuze. This seems to be the particular stage of
dogs and wolves. You will let me be the one who dismembering it all as I am doing, occupy the place of the “exemplary stupid”: affairs of criticism.

In these circumstances, and speeding up reading, while recognizing him many things in this issue [bêtise as something that would be beyond knowledge (i.e. beyond error), the relationship established by Deleuze in Différence et Répétition between the bêtise and evil, between the bêtise and sovereignty], it seems that the operation that Derrida finally performed with Deleuze is similar to that which he starts regarding Flaubert and Baudelaire in “Une idée de Flaubert: ‘la lettre of Plato’” and Donner le temps. Finishing thus with this set of quotations and cross references: everything happens as if to Derrida, Deleuze, ultimately [carried away by speed or sarcasm, carried away by that feeling of “seeing the bêtise and not being able to tolerate”, considering also that the same would be only in mankind (that poor animals, prevented as they are of the depth, could not never do silly things)], also, as Flaubert and Baudelaire in what was a kind of nineteenth-century crusade against stupidity, would have got too smart. As if in that “getting too smart” (which is always a sovereign situation) and in that using the bêtise as insulting category, Deleuze himself had fallen into the bêtise. For example: when writing that psychoanalysis says nonsense/stupidities in general, and that with respect to animals in particular says still more nonsense/stupidities; for example: in writing that everyone who love dogs are assholes; for example: when writing that Freud knows absolutely nothing, that he is blind and short-sighted; etc. That is, and for what interests me here ultimately: it is as if Deleuze, pretending to be sufficiently “Wolf”, all a Steppenwolf, would have been, precisely in which respects animals, at a precise moment, rather a dog: reducer [i.e. say that the animals are protected by specific forms of falling into the bêtise (for another lecture, the bêtise of Derrida, see STIGLER, 2012)] excessively conclusive or blunt (“oui, la bêtise consiste à vouloir conclure”). Or as if, when he also spoke of the stupidities in the reading of Wolfmann, it had not been multiple enough (see ABRAHAM; TOROK, 1976, p. 142). Because, certainly, polyglot, patient reading of Abraham and Torok of the dream of the Wolfmann is [even if there was
who framed it within the order of delirium (Lacan)] decidedly more complex and rich (it starts, performs, *the multiple*) than the analyses of Deleuze and Guattari in *Mille Plateaux*, which, by appealing to the multiplicity on the reductive silliness of the dog, do not carry out, I would say, the same in the text, at least not in which refers to the case. In this way, the Deleuzian conclusion, applied to the own Deleuze (although there is no nothing more foolish that wanting to conclude, allow me, please, this stupidity too), would be that the *bêtise* must be able to tolerate (tolerate the intolerable) because, precisely, as Deleuze says, it is always my *bêtise*; or in other words: because the Anti-Oedipus (as the other thing *figurable of* Oedipus) does not *exist*, and if it existed, it is no longer the hyperbolic counter-reply of the dog, i.e. it is always possible that Oedipus may “be me” when I make Anti-Oedipus. And, then, that someone releases a bark (for example, Deleuze, who also said that barking was the shame of the animal kingdom) there when he wanted to howl will always be possible.

**Three focuses on the future of Oedipus**

Given that I refuse to conclude, I could open, beyond the specific nature of these associations, three possible sources on these issues. They are only flashes: (1) Firstly I’d point out the name of Oedipus in philosophy: up to what point can the philosopher abandon Oedipus *heritage*? Oedipus is not only one of the emblems of psychoanalysis: reduction to one and to the authority; construction of a complex [*“the Complex”* (B. Malinowski, *Sex and repression in Savage Society*)], etc. There are others anterior and posterior since the introduction of the same in philosophy by Aristotle. There is an Oedipus in Schelling, Hegel, Heidegger, etc: they are tragic *Oedipuses*. Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe has reminded us in *L’imitation des modernes* (1983 text in which he, very surprisingly, neither refers to Deleuze; systematic refusal of the group of texts that are written around Derrida). If Οδίπους Τύραννος by Sophocles is the tragedy par excellence, and if the tragic is the mold of the speculative (Hölderlin), then Oedipus, not the one who solves puzzles, but the one
who cries and abandons himself after realizing what he has done: it is the figure of irresolvable contradiction, an incorruptible figure of philosophy. Because: what if Oedipus were also inhabited by multitudes? There are notes about blind Oedipus in *L’autoportrait en ruines*: the Oedipus that take out its eyes and walks with three bloody mouths. There is also a relationship between seeing and power, and, therefore, an emphasis on blindness as *impouvoir* in Derrida. (2) The second focus, following the Hegelian figure of Oedipus, the one decoding the riddle of the Sphinx pronouncing the word “Man” [a word that, says Gide, Oedipus would go to pronounce anyway, whichever was the proposed riddle (Walter Benjamin)], would be centered upon, following relations between *bêtise* and Absolute Knowledge, the “Egyptian question” in Derrida: as you know, very early he became interested in ancient writings, and, in particular, for some value of the Egyptian: both with regard to the question of dream (*Traumdeutung*), and to the issue of history. “Scribble”, his preface to the book by W. Warburton, is perhaps the exemplary text. Question: what if this way of insisting on Egyptian motifs lengthwise, very particularly, the late sixties and early seventies, was nothing but a way of vindicating the prehistoric as a kind of warp from which we can never leave? The presence of Oedipus and the sphinx in “Le Puits et la pyramide. Introduction à la sémiologie de Hegel” makes me think about all this. And above all, it reminds me of a beautiful picture of Franz Ritter Von Stuck, *Der Kuss von der Sphinx* (1895), in which the Sphinx kisses Oedipus passionately, it haunts me from a long time ago. (3) The third focus would be to imagine a possible exchange between Deleuze and Derrida with regard to the tragic: a meeting in the dissimilar hearts of Hegel and Nietzsche. As regards the relations of Deleuze with Hegel, C. Malabou, on the one hand, in his “Who’s Afraid of Hegelian Wolves?” (see MALABOU, 1996), and Žižek, on the other hand, in its *Organs without Bodies*, have said interesting things. Both have designed another Hegel: and they have not deprived themselves of letting Deleuze know, although the latter did not already exist. As will be recalled, Žižek imagines Hegel “taking Deleuze from behind” (ŽIŽEK, 2004, p. 45; see PRECIADO, 2011); which is nothing but a perverse way to show Deleuze (“fuck up
the ass”, bother, we say that in Spanish; but above all don’t “send to take the ass”), at least I read it that way, why Freud knew more than what Deleuze imagined about asses [some combination of Freud and Deleuze from Oedipus as common figure: “gracias y desgracias del nobilissimo señor ojo del culo” (Francisco de Quevedo)]. In fact, this sodomite image is already imagined by Derrida regarding the postcard between Socrates and Plato in the “Envois”. And one could imagine it with so many others actors, even if one is never sure who is behind and who is forward, and although I always had the suspicion that, in the case of Derrida and Deleuze, places would always be, despite the clues that we have followed, interchangeable (i.e., a love story). But none of the two, neither Malabou nor Žižek (I go back to the beginning of the third focus), deal with tragic theme, nor they put it in relation to Derrida. I think that tragedy, between Derrida and Deleuze, is an important issue. And tragic, very sad indeed, was no doubt that there wasn’t, finally, a conversation, as Jean-Luc Nancy wanted, as he was preparing for several years as a privileged interviewer.

References


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