What of proposition 2.1 after the Tractatus ? Wittgenstein and the many ways “we make to ourselves pictures of facts”

In this paper I enquire 1) whether Wittgenstein retains the notion of picture after the Tractatus in a way that is more than simply an equivocation, so to speak, an ambiguous use of the term according to multiple meanings or senses; and, if so, 2) what the consequences of this might be for Wittgenstein’s understanding of philosophy as an activity of clarification. More precisely, I shall take into consideration three possible interpretations of the Tractatus’ (use of) ‘picture’ and adopt the one according to which what Wittgenstein notes in his later writings may be regarded as a further development of and a variation on it. My goal is to show that Wittgenstein’s new thoughts on pictures and on the many ways “ [w]e make to ourselves pictures of facts” (TLP: 2.1) reveal a certain aspect that is not immediately evident, yet is inherent in the Tractatus’ notion of picture: pictures lie at root of the


Introduction
This paper discusses the notion of picture in Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy. In particular, it addresses the question of whether the picture, whose role is undoubtedly central in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1 can be considered a core theme of Wittgenstein's overall philosophical production, and whether it also occurs in his later works, remaining almost unchanged or maybe undergoing major changes in the way it is conceived. 2 As is widely known, in the Tractatus thoughts and propositions are understood as pictures (Bilder) (see TLP: 3, 4.01); and -it is worth noting right from the startthey are envisaged as such not only, or not so much, in some strange or peculiar sense, 1 Significantly, so-called 'Picture Theory' is often regarded as one of the cornerstones of the Tractatus. 2 For previous approaches to this question cf. Nyíri 2006, Phillips 2011and Westergaard 2003.
What of proposition 2.1 after the Tractatus? 107 Rev. Filos., Aurora, Curitiba, v. 34, n. 63, p. 105-122, out./dez. 2022 but "even in the ordinary sense of the word" (TLP: 4.011). 3 Pictures, however, also seem to lie at the centre of Wittgenstein's mature writings (produced from 1929 onwards), where they appear and are evoked in several contexts, in relation to different issues. In particular, pictures acquire a crucial role in connection to Wittgenstein's so-called metaphilosophy, i.e. to the genesis and possibility of a solution (or dissolution) of the kind of linguistic-conceptual confusion and dogmatism "into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy" (PI: I, § 131). From this perspective, a picture is that "perspicuous representation" (übersichliche Darstellung) which produces understanding -it is the tool enabling "a clear view" (übersehen) (PI: I, § 122).
The question to be addressed, then, can more precisely be formulated as follows: is there anything that remains of the Tractatus' reasoning in the way in which the notion of picture is used in subsequent texts, in a certain sense and for certain purposes? Conversely, is there anything in Wittgenstein's "old thoughts" that appears "in the right light" thanks to his "new ones" (PI: Preface, p. viii), 4 particularly in relation to the idea of philosophy as an activity of clarification (see TLP: 4.112)?

Tree ways of interpreting Tractatus' 'picture' and its fate
It is possible to identify three ways of answering the question of the fate of the topic of pictures in Wittgenstein, coinciding with as many interpretations of what pictures are according to Wittgenstein (that is, the first, but also the second, and possibly third, Wittgenstein), and of what role he assigns them.
3 In a conversation with some members of the Wiener Kreis, Wittgenstein apparently acknowledged that, in speaking of propositions as pictures in the Tractatus, he had also had the mathematical notion of picture in mind and that " [h]ere [that is, in speaking of propositions as pictures] the expression 'picture' is already taken in an extended sense" (WVC: p. 185). 4 The topic of pictures can be included among those in relation to which Wittgenstein's new thoughts "could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of [his] old way of thinking" (PI: Preface, p. viii). in the sense of a model, 5 insofar as it represents reality in a truthful or false way.
Furthermore, the idea of a picture as a model is closely related to two aspects which play a significant role in the Tractatus. The first is the fact that a picture anticipates, rather than follows, reality, so to speak; this is quite clear from proposition 4.01 where, after claiming that a proposition is a picture of reality, Wittgenstein, to avoid misunderstandings, feels the need to add that "a proposition is a model of reality as we think it is" (TLP: 4.01). The second, closely related aspect is the fact that no pictures (and hence no thoughts or propositions) are true and correct a priori. In sum, being a picture -in the technical and exclusive sense assigned to the term by the Tractatus, according to this first interpretation -means being a true or false representation of something; so it is by stating that a proposition is a picture that the Tractatus describes and justifies the bipolarity of propositions. In the analogy according to which each proposition is a picture, the notion of picture is used -and must be understood -in a specific sense, the specific sense assigned to it by the Tractatus. Normally, when I gaze at a painting, say, or watch a film, I don't believe (imagine) for a moment that the people I see in it really exist, or that there have really been people in that situation (PI: I, § 522).
Truth (or falsehood) is not a relevant or salient aspect, in order for the picture to work as such.
3. A third interpretation (the one that seems the most plausible to me) and corresponding way of addressing the question of what happens to pictures after the Tractatus is to acknowledge that this notion is subsequently taken up and enriched.
The answer to our question then becomes that Wittgenstein's later writings lend little support to the claim that the topic of pictures fades away after the Tractatus and that the importance assigned to it in this text should be included among those "grave Likewise, the idea that the features assigned to pictures in the Tractatus are later lost or completely redefined finds little support. As we shall see, it is certainly true that, after the Tractatus, Wittgenstein acknowledges that pictures can sometimes serve as a good term or object of comparison (see PI: I, § 130) for propositions. "The picture was the key. Or it seemed like a key" (Z: § 240) to him, 6 but this is not enough to conclude -with the Tractatus -that propositions are pictures: to do so would be a sign of the kind of dogmatism "into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy", and which consists in taking a term of comparison "as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond" (PI: I, § 131); moreover, it is true that the critical remarks which Wittgenstein formulates after the Tractatus often concern the attempt to assign pictures -particularly mental ones -a quasi-magical role and power that they do not and cannot have. But while all this is true, it is equally true that such critical remarks do not dismiss pictures completely, but only acknowledge that there are various other things that we call -and can call -'a picture', 'the making of a picture', 'the recognising of a picture as the picture of…', and so on.
Besides, 'making to ourselves a picture' entails making many different things.
For example, it means adopting the most suitable medium, thereby anticipating in a way the reality of which we are making a picture. not coloured, but left blank, does not mean that the building or buildings will all be white, once they have been constructed. Or let us consider the case of photography.
It seems evident that a photograph -for example, the photograph of an Alpine landscape -comes after the reality it represents, so to speak. However, it may be argued that it anticipates it, in the sense that the resulting photograph will depend on many preliminary things -for instance, and primarily, from the choice of photographing the landscape rather than painting it, from the frame, and from the film (a colour or black & white one).
The fact that we make to ourselves pictures of reality does not mean that we can make the pictures we want or how we want them or in whatever way strikes our fancy. For instance, once we have chosen to craft the model (the picture) of a neighbourhood using polystyrene cubes, we are bound to this "form of representation" (TLP: 2.151). As we read in the Tractatus, [t]he picture can represent every reality whose form it has. The spatial picture, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc. (TLP: 2.171).
As is widely known, Wittgenstein describes those pictures that are not bound to any specific form of representation (e.g. spatial, chromatic, etc.) as "logical" (TLP: 2.181). As we have already seen, thoughts and propositions are logical pictures.
For example, in the proposition "On the brown table there is a book with a red cover", the word 'table' is not written in brown ink and the word 'cover' is not written in red ink -nor is the word 'book' spatially located above the word ' (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): "The general form of propositions is: This is how things are."--That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it (PI: I, § 114).

Besides, in the Big Typescript he poses the question quite openly:
In what sense can I say that a proposition is a picture? If I think about it, I'm inclined to say: It has to be a picture so that it can show me what I am supposed to do, so that I can be guided by it. But then all you really want to say is that you are guided by the proposition in the same sense in which you are guided by a picture. A picture is a description. Is every picture a proposition? And what does it mean to say, for example, that every picture can be used as a proposition?
[…] Saying that the proposition is a picture emphasizes certain features in the grammar of the word 'proposition' (BT: § 21).
Making a proposition a picture, then, is simply a way to highlight or emphasise certain features of the word 'proposition'. Furthermore, what we have is not just the kind of picture whose features allow us to say that a proposition is a picture, but different kinds of pictures. In an annotation from 1937 whose first part came to be included in Zettel, Wittgenstein writes: As can be seen, although there are some reasons to say that Weltbild and Weltanschauung are not exactly the same, clearly they both have something to do with a form of representation (see Perissinotto 2021: p. 233).
"Propositions serve to describe how things are", we think. Given all this, it is necessary to emphasise at least the three following points.
The first is that, both in the Tractatus and in subsequent writings, Wittgenstein uses the term 'picture' to refer to a wide range of different things: sketches, thoughts, paintings, propositions, drawings, mental images, mathematical and architectural models, photographs, maps, diagrams, etc., acknowledging that "a picture, whatever it may be, can be variously interpreted" (Z: § 236).
The second point is that Wittgenstein sees no significant difference -or no difference in principle -between material pictures and mental pictures, so to speak; indeed, one of his main concerns is to rule out that the latter, insofar as they are mental, may do something that the former, in their materiality, cannot do. In this respect, we might argue not only that one of Wittgenstein's recurrent polemical targets is the 'mythology' of the mental process -however and in whatever guise it may present itself -but also that his whole analysis of mental processes neither presupposes nor justifies any sort of substance dualism between the material and the mental, between body and mind. Certainly, in relation to logic, but also meaning and when someone tells me "It's raining", I normally look out of the window, rather than at this person. 11 Likewise, when I am gazing at a painting and someone asks me what I see, I don't usually answer "A painting", less still "Some pigments applied to a canvas"; rather, I will answer something along the lines of "A port city" -even though I obviously know the difference between gazing at the painting of a city and gazing at the same city from the window in my room. Clearly, there are some circumstances in which I would answer "A painting": for example, if I were a mover who has been entrusted with taking the painting from one museum to another. The same is true for "It's raining". If someone who is checking my hearing says "It's raining" and then asks me "What did I say?", my answer will not be "You said that it's raining", but "You said: It's raining". This point is neatly illustrated by an annotation in Zettel, where Wittgenstein points out that the people portrayed in a black & white photograph are not black & white, so to speak: Let us remember too that we don't have to translate such pictures into realistic ones in order to 'understand' them, any more than we ever translate photographs or film pictures into coloured pictures, although black-and-white men or plants in reality would strike us as unspeakably strange and frightful. Suppose we were to say at this point: "Something is a picture only in a picture-language"? (Z: 242).
From the Tractatus Wittgenstein also borrow -albeit with significant variations -the idea that no pictures are true or correct a priori, and that a picture is such even if -as in the case of a genre painting -I do not believe or think that what it represents truly exists. Even in such cases, the picture has a hold on me: When I look at a genre-picture, it 'tells' me something, even though I don't believe (imagine) for a moment that the people I see in it really exist, or that there have really been people in that situation. But suppose I ask: "What does it tell me, then?" (PI: I, § 522).
The answer which Wittgenstein feels he should give to the question at the end of this passage is "What the picture tells me is itself" (PI: I, § 523). As he immediately goes on to explain, this answer amounts to saying that "its telling me something consists in its own structure, in its own lines and colours" (PI: I, § 523 In this sense, there is nothing mysterious in the picture. There is no need for some magic to turn shapes and colours into a picture. If I wish to make a sketch of a hill, I will grab a pencil and a sheet of paper, and start drawing. Then a picture will appear. However, we cannot stop here. What Wittgenstein is suggesting, somewhat hesitantly, is that perhaps we should say that "[s]omething is a picture only in a picture-language" (Z: § 242). Something is a picture because many other pictures exist, concern ourselves with its further interpretability. 13

Picture and philosophical clarification
Both in the Tractatus and in the Investigations (and other later works) Wittgenstein envisages philosophy as an activity of clarification. According to the Tractatus, [t]he object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity.
[…] The result of philosophy is not a number of 'philosophical propositions', but to make propositions clear (TLP: 4.112).
We find something very similar, twenty years later, in the Investigations: Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.
[…] One might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions (PI: I, § 126).
We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.